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 This thesis analyzes the impact of nuclear weapon on the doctrine and 
force structure of the US Army during the Early Cold War (1947-1957).  It 
compares these impacts with those that occurred on the US Air Force and Navy 
during that time.  Nuclear weapons brought a new aspect to warfare.  Their 
unprecedented economy of destructive power changed the way nations viewed 
warfare.  For the Army, nuclear weapons presented a dual challenge.  The Army 
faced a US security policy centered on the massive use of these weapons; the 
Army also struggled to understand how these weapons would be utilized on the 
battlefield.  The nation’s security policy of large scale strategic nuclear 
bombardment of the Soviet Union favored the Air Force and to a lesser degree 
the Navy.  The Army viewed this policy as single minded and purposely limiting 
the nations options to all out nuclear war or deference to another national will.  In 
all the Army faced an internal struggle to incorporate these weapons and an 
external struggle to retain a useful position within the US Defense establishment 
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I. THE ARMY BEFORE LAST: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 
AND THE IMPACT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE US ARMY 
IN THE EARLY COLD WAR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Army is the world’s premier land combat force.  The 
Army’s recent exploits in Afghanistan and Iraq have proven the agility, capability 
and lethality of the Army and of the American armed forces in general.  
Sustaining and enhancing this capability are the cornerstones of “Defense 
Transformation” an ongoing process of integrating and reforming the American 
defense establishment.  
The current US military is essentially the product of the combat lessons of 
World War II and the preparations to fight the Soviet military during the Cold War.  
Tactics, techniques and equipment refined during both of those wars led to the 
victory in Desert Storm as well as the success of the peacemaking and 
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.  Ongoing efforts throughout the 
1990’s to capitalize on emerging information technologies enhanced the forces 
that defeated the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and ousted Saddam Hussein in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom two years later.  The Army is always changing, by 
improving its weapons systems, altering its force structure, or refining its doctrine 
and tactics.  This process always involves the interaction of recent combat 
experience, budget realities, and the exploitation of a new technology.  Any 
change in an institution such as the Army is a skilled balance of risk versus 
reward. 
The early Cold War represented a comparably intense period for military 
change.  Before the Second World War, the American army and navy had been 
primarily hemispheric defense forces.  The challenge of defeating both Germany 
and Japan required a massive land force for Europe and an equally large naval 
force for the vast Pacific theater.  Furthermore, World War II saw an exceptional 
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growth of military technology including improved mechanization, radios, jet 
engines, and, most significantly, the atomic bomb.   
 The end of the war saw a massive drawdown of military forces, coinciding 
with an increase in tensions with the Soviet Union.  As this new conflict 
developed, the armed forces of the US had to begin to develop a new security 
strategy.  The availability of the atomic bomb promised the most efficient option 
for a smaller American military.  The emerging national strategy relied heavily on 
the potential use of atomic weapons, and seemed to expect only a global scale 
conflict with the Soviet Union.   
For the Army, this period represented a time of unease over its strategic 
role. During the Korean War the Army tried to embrace the new nuclear 
technology in the form of atomic weapons delivery systems, in hopes that these 
would provide a solution to its troubles.  This period also saw vigorous 
disagreement among the services over defense strategy, service missions, and 
defense budget.  The current challenge for the US military is no less difficult, 
although the interservice conflicts of that earlier time have subsided, and the US 
military and defense leaders have a more planned program of change than in the 
past. 
B. CURRENT MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 
Since 1991, the US military has labored to maintain its warfighting 
capability while reducing its overall size. The Department of Defense and the 
services inaugurated a program of force reductions and base closures, while 
simultaneously exploring new technology to improve overall capabilities.  The 
peacekeeping and engagement operations of the mid-to-late 1990s provided a 
venue in which the military could experiment with new systems and technologies.  
This process was proceeding, albeit slowly given the post-Cold War budget 
realities.   
President George W. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
came to office determined to maintain the vigor in this process of  
“Transformation.”  Consequently, transformation has led to difficult decisions 
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about weapons systems the armed forces were planning to buy, and programs 
the services were committed to undertake.  The Army lost its “next-generation” 
artillery when Secretary Rumsfeld canceled the “Crusader” self-propelled artillery 
system in 2000, and the Army itself cancelled the “Comanche” helicopter 
program in 2004.  Other service weapons systems have also come under 
scrutiny, with some programs being trimmed in size or cancelled altogether. 
Many have argued that such fundamental change for the armed services is 
needed and long overdue.   
While there is certain to be heated debate over the shape and pace of the 
change, its inevitability is not in doubt.  As Max Boot points out, transformation is 
“a change of mindset that will allow the military to harness the technological 
advances of the information age to gain a qualitative advantage over any 
potential foe.”1  Further, as Eliot Cohen says, “A transformation of combat means 
change in the fundamental relationship between offense and defense, space and 
time, fire and maneuver.”2  Transformation is therefore more than just newer, 
better equipment and tactics.  It is also new thinking about warfare and how best 
to prosecute it successfully with improved information awareness and systems.  
The Army launched its latest transformation effort in October 1999 under 
the guidance of then Army chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki.  During this time, 
the Army was engaged in two major peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, yet otherwise not deployed on a large scale.  The timing was right for 
the Army to begin looking at how it would posture itself for the 21st Century. M 
aking the Army lighter and more mobile were key goals.  The long deployment 
time for heavy armored forces were a luxury the Army could no longer afford, as 
it became increasingly involved in so-called Small Scale Contingencies or SSC.  
These SSCs are neither full-scale war nor pure humanitarian assistance type 
missions but a difficult blend of both.  The Army would be required to fight 
initially, then transition to peacekeeping and stability operations.  
 
1 Max Boot, The New American Way of War (July/August 2003, Foreign Affairs) p.42 
2 Eliot Cohen, A Revolution in Warfare (March/April 1996, Foreign Affairs) p. 44 
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This change in the Army is not the first effort at altering the composition 
and role of the Army, merely the latest.  There have been previous efforts, some 
of which sought whole scale changes in the structure of the Army, others that 
focused on the doctrine of the Army and how it fights while limiting the structural 
changes.  In both cases, there were proponents and critics that desired or 
resisted change.  In both cases, there were critical figures and events that made 
or forced tough decisions.  In any event, change for the Army is difficult because 
as it embraces new technology for its soldiers, it may inadvertently increase their 
risk.  Technology and information age science may or may not be able to replace 
combat power.   
The military information revolution recently witnessed in Afghanistan and 
Iraq was preceded by another distinct revolution, that of nuclear weapons.  
Nuclear weapons altered the conduct of warfare after World War II. They played 
a role in Superpower calculations throughout the Cold War.  The prospect of a 
localized conflict expanding into a global nuclear conflict occupied strategists and 
planners from both sides.  Preventing such an occurrence and controlling if it did 
happen was essential, given the stakes involved. 
C. THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION 
The advent of atomic weapons is the most dramatic of the Revolutions in 
Military Affairs of the 20th century.  An RMA “involves a paradigm shift in the 
nature and conduct of military operations.”3  Such a shift renders obsolete or 
irrelevant on or more core competencies of a dominant player, or creates one or 
more new core competencies in some new dimension of warfare.4  The atomic 
bomb rendered cities and large military formations vulnerable to a single weapon 
delivered by a single delivery system, against which there was no viable defense.  
The atomic bomb transformed warfare by virtue of its sheer destructive 
power, and by compressing the time and reducing the resources needed to 
 
3 Richard O. Hundley, Past Revolutions, Future Transformations: What can the history of 
Revolutions in Military Affairs tell us about Transforming the U.S. Military? (Santa Monica, CA, 
RAND, 1999), p.9 
4 Ibid, p.9 
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accomplish such destruction.  Armed with an atomic bomb, one airplane could 
destroy an entire city or significantly damage a geographic region.  A fleet of 
such aircraft or missiles could destroy a county in a few hours.  As Bernard 
Brodie points out: 
In fact the essential change introduced by the atomic bomb is not 
that it will make war more violent- a city can be as effectively 
destroyed with TNT and incendiaries- but that it will concentrate the 
violence in terms of time.  A world accustomed to thinking it horrible 
that wars should last four or five years is now appalled at the 
prospect that future wars may last only a few days.5
The revolutionary impact of atomic weapons lies in the economy of their 
destructive power. As technology improved, atomic weapons became smaller 
and applicable to an increasing number of military scenarios.  The military began 
to conceive of their use in situations other than a strategic campaign against the 
Soviet heartland, and to develop new delivery systems, force structures and 
doctrine to capitalize on them.  All the armed sought to emphasize their unique 
ability to utilize these weapons in their specific medium of combat.  The effective 
delivery of a nuclear weapon became increasingly synonymous with each 
services’ contribution to national strategy. 
D. THE MILITARY SERVICES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
World War II brought about profound change in how the United States 
fought wars.  The development of aviation technology allowed for a massed air 
force of a kind envisioned a generation earlier by airpower theorists like Gullio 
Douhet and Hugh Trenchard.   The maturation of “strategic bombing” during 
World War II, led to the creation of the Air Force as a separate service after the 
war.  
Nuclear weapons delivery was deemed a critical mission for the new Air 
Force, and a logical extension of strategic bombing theory.  Nuclear weapons 
and strategic bombing was a harmonious match for the Air Force. During the 
 
5 Phillip Bobbit, Lawrence Freedman and Gregory F. Trevorton, editors, U.S. Nuclear 
Strategy: A Reader (New York, New York University Press, 1989), p. 67 
  6
early Cold War, the Air Force held a virtual monopoly on nuclear weapons 
delivery, as the service had the only airplanes capable of carrying the new 
weapons to the range needed.  The Air Force senior leaders were intellectually 
attuned to the concept of strategic bombing, and nuclear weapons reinforced that 
intellectual and institutional connection throughout the Cold War.  
As for the Navy, the advances in aircraft led to the demise of the battleship 
and to the primacy of the aircraft carrier.  During the war aircraft carriers and 
naval aviation had performed roughly the same traditional functions as 
battleships (sea control, shore bombardment, etc.), but with greater range and 
accuracy. Although other surface ships were still needed, their predominant 
mission was to defend the carrier.  The Navy emerged from the war strongly 
oriented toward combat in the air, and under the sea.  Its aircraft carriers and 
submarines had won the Pacific campaign, destroying Japan’s navy and 
interdicting its supplies.  Additionally, the Navy was more attuned to the 
operational and tactical use of airpower in support of ground troops and 
amphibious landings.   
The Army had emerged from World War II as the service suffering the 
greatest overall loss in the US defense establishment.  It underwent a large 
drawdown of personnel and had a significant portion of its wartime force structure 
separated to make the US Air Force.  There were also additional constraints 
placed on the Army about what type of aircraft it could possess to support its 
operations.  The Army was left with minimal control of tactical and cargo aircraft, 
which it needed for deployment and combat.  A final but not any less important 
distinction for the Army was the nation’s new strategic outlook, which relied on 
nuclear weapons the predominant instrument for war.  The Army saw this 
strategy as a bureaucratic loss of roles and missions to the Air Force and (to a 
lesser degree) the Navy, and also as a strategic folly, in that only limited account 
was taken of other types of conflict that might involve US forces. 
The Army’s struggle with nuclear weapons in the early Cold War was 
undertaken in this environment.  As A.J. Bacevich writes: 
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The Army found itself grappling for the first time with the perplexing 
implications of nuclear warfare; seeking ways of adapting its 
organization and doctrine to accommodate rapid technological 
advance; and attempting to square apparently revolutionary change 
with traditional habits and practical constraints of the military art.6
First, the Army had to contend with the primacy of the Air Force, the chief 
instrument of a national strategy focused on strategic nuclear bombardment of 
the Soviet Union.  It was in light of this institutional competition, and in order to 
claim a share of defense resources equivalent to that of its sister services, that 
the Army embraced nuclear weapons., It did so even though it saw these 
weapons as creating a tactical stalemate, rather than as the key to victory.   
E. THESIS AND DESIGN 
In this thesis, I will conduct a historical analysis of this challenging period 
in the military history of the United States, mainly that of nuclear weapons and 
their transformative impact on the armed services and the Army in particular, 
during the early Cold War (The period from 1947 to 1957).  I will start by looking 
at the Air Force and the Navy’s incorporation of this weapon.  I will then look at 
the Army’s adaptation to nuclear weapons including its experience in the Korean 
War. This adaptation will be viewed in terms of actual systems and force 
structure.  Finally, I will look at the doctrinal impacts of atomic weapons for the 
Army. How did the Army adjust to the “atomic age”?  What changes in force 
structure, institutional thought, doctrine and tactics did the Army undergo?  What 
lessons can be learned from that period that can be applied to the current 
transformation process? 
Overall, the intent is to provide some context to the changes the Army is 
currently making in its force structure, doctrine and thinking based on its past 
experiences.  The Army today faces a situation comparable in difficulty and 
complexity to that which it faced in the early Cold War. Today the United States 
faces a continuing threat from terrorism whereas in the Early Cold War it faced a 
 
6 A.J. Bacevich, The PENTOMIC ERA: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam 
(Washington D.C., National Defense University Press, 1986), p. 4 
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continuing threat in the form of Communism.  Today the new technology of the 
information age brings computers and networks, in the Early Cold War the new 
technology was the Atomic Bomb. Finally, today the Army’s doctrinal challenge is 
how to structure forces and train to fight terrorism; the Early Cold War saw the 




II. THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION AND THE UNITED STATES 
AIR FORCE AND NAVY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear weapons represented an unprecedented technological 
advancement to warfare in the 20th century.  Their destructiveness represented 
an exceptional economy in weapons capability.  These weapons also required a 
shift in how nations and militaries approached war.  Today, nuclear weapons 
continue to affect policy and strategy. 
In 1947, the United States Air Force (USAF) came into existence under 
the aegis of the National Security Act of 1947.  The advocates of airpower finally 
had an independent air arm with which to conduct large scale strategic bombing.  
Coupled with the destructive capability of nuclear weapons, the USAF came to 
the vanguard of US national security policy.  The ability to deliver nuclear 
weapons to the Soviet Union gave the USAF an integral role in determining US 
defense priorities.   
The United States Navy had come out of World War II, as a professional, 
“blue water” navy.  The Navy had retained its air assets under NSA 1947, 
although it had to submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, losing its 
position as one of two services with Presidential access.  The Navy had 
embraced nuclear energy as both a weapons system and a propulsion system.  
The Navy had incorporated nuclear weapons as another weapon in its arsenal, 
rather than the central asset for Naval weapons and strategy. 
Both military and political leaders struggled with the implications of these 
new weapons.  Were nuclear weapons just an extension of weapons technology 
albeit larger and more destructive, but used in fundamentally the same way?  
Were these weapons something completely new in warfare, requiring new ways 
of warfighting doctrine and tactics?  In either case, these weapons had an impact 
on the US military in that they defined defense programs, budgets and strategy.  
  10
                                                
This paper will look at how nuclear weapons affected the United States Air Force 
and Navy in the early years of the Cold War.   
B. REVOLUTIONS 
The concept of a “Revolution in Military Affairs” or RMA originated with the 
Soviets in the 1950s.  The Soviets phrasing encompassed not only technology 
but also ideas.  The Soviet Military journal Red Star wrote: 
The revolution in the military field has taken place not only in the 
field of material means of waging war, but also in the realm of 
ideas.  It has required a radical review of existing military-
theoretical views, a working out of new principles of military 
science, and a thorough development of all its constituent parts and 
branches on a new basis.7
Although a term du jour today, this concept was not universally accepted in the 
1950s.  Nevertheless, the advent of nuclear weapons had an impact on national 
strategies but also military doctrine.  
In the United States, military and civilian thinkers began to understand that 
nuclear weapons represented more than just another new weapon in the 
arsenals.  Much of the argument over these weapons centered on whether they 
represented a capability for a military force to do it job better, or they represented 
a requirement to fight war with a completely different set of technology and 
doctrine.  This discourse coupled with the lessons learned from the victory in 
World War II left the United States in a dilemma of applying the new weapon to 
existing thought on warfare or developing a new form of warfare.  Obviously, 
those in the military knew what had worked on the battlefield, yet nuclear 
weapons had been used on Japan in much the same context that the Army Air 
Force had been using conventional bombing raids on Japanese cities. Initially, 
the only difference the military saw was that of the economy of scale between 
one B-29 carrying one bomb and a 1,000-plane formation carrying thousands of 
conventional bombs.   
 
7 Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., Soviet Military Strategy in Europe (New York, Pergamon Press, 
1980) p.22 
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Throughout the 1950’s however, the continued development of 
thermonuclear weapons of ever increasing destructive capability imposed 
changes on both the military doctrine and the political strategy guiding the U.S. 
military.  Previous thoughts on strategic airpower, focused on attacking an 
enemy’s war making capability, with nuclear weapons, an attack on that 
capability generally included his cities.  The economy of nuclear weapons and 
strategic bombing arguably reduced the need and requirement for large-scale 
land or even naval warfare.  As Bernard Brodie wrote in Strategy in the Missile 
Age: 
When we say that strategic bombing will be decisive, we mean that 
if it occurs on the grand scale that existing forces make possible, 
other kinds of military operations are likely to prove both unfeasible 
and superfluous.  The Red Army, if poised to spring, could perhaps 
have a certain brief career as an autonomous force even if its 
homeland were laid entirely waste behind it, though in such a case 
it would itself also be the target of nuclear weapons of all sizes.8
 
The economy of nuclear weapons, a single device with exponential 
destructive power, coupled with the brief requirement for time invested in a 
bombing campaign made them revolutionary.  These weapons married to a 
newly independent air arm, made for a service that would dominate US military 
and strategic policy throughout the Cold War and certainly the early years of that 
standoff. 
C. DEFINING THE NEW THREAT 1947-1955 
The end of World War II saw the United States begin a massive 
demobilization of its forces as well as the establishment of the Defense 
Department and the United States Air Force.  The Army was executing force 
reductions and conducting occupation duties in Germany and Japan and the 
Navy was in similar circumstances, the Air Force was struggling with its 
establishment.  In general, the armed forces of the United States had ageing 
 
8 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 
1959) p.166 
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equipment and limited numbers of personnel.  As the Cold War developed and 
American attention turned to dealing with the Soviet Union as a competitor rather 
than an ally, the armed forces were aware of the threat from the Soviets, but 
were unable to maintain conventional forces to deal with the threat.  Nuclear 
weapons were viewed as an offset for the reduced armed forces.  This was more 
of a political decision than a military one.  Army leaders obviously would have 
preferred to maintain sufficient conventional forces to counter the Soviet force, 
especially in Europe.  Army Chief of Staff Mathew Ridgeway (1953-55) believed 
that the Eisenhower administration should invest in forces that were “properly 
balanced and of adequate readiness” which in turn would be an effective 
deterrent rather than increasing investment in nuclear weapons and delivery 
systems.9  This thinking was based on the Army’s belief that nuclear weapons 
would stalemate and conflict would return to the conventional realm. 
As tensions began to increase, thinkers with in the government began to 
articulate theories about Soviet policies and goals.  George Kennan’s “The 
Sources of Soviet Conduct” is clearly the standard for such documents; the US 
government’s response to that document was NSC-68, which was adopted in 
April 1950.   In NSC-68, Paul Nitze defined the current and projected situation of 
conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.  As NSC-68 states, 
“The Kremlin regards the United States as the only major threat to the 
achievement of its fundamental design.”10  This document and others written 
during this time outlined American strategic thinking and policies throughout the 
Cold War.   
Among the ideas contained in NSC-68, was the recognition that the US 
monopoly on nuclear weapons had disappeared as a consequence of the Soviet 
atomic detonation in August 1949.  Further, even if American ground and naval 
forces were expanded, this alone would not be enough to deter the Soviets from 
 
9 A.J. Bacevich, The PENTOMIC Era: The U.S. Army between Korea and Vietnam 
(Washington D.C., National Defense University Press, 1986) p. 38 
10 Steven L. Rearden, The Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine, SAIS Papers Number 4, 
p.90 
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attacking.11   As stress between the two nations developed, each nation’s atomic 
stockpile would increase, further raising tensions.  The fear of general war in the 
early 1950’s was profound; accentuating this fear was the Soviets willingness to 
risk escalation by the conflict in Korea.  Soviet support for North Korea and then 
China, visibly represented to the United States a possible first move for the 
Soviets, potentially followed by actions in Europe.  For instance as Marc 
Trachtenberg points out, “It was taken for granted that a serious Soviet 
intervention in the war would lead to World War III, and not just to a local U.S.-
Soviet war in the Far East. “12     
The fear at the time was not just of war with the Soviets, but the possibility 
that the United States stood the possibility of losing it.  Not only were U.S. ground 
forces numerically smaller, the United States had a limited ability to deliver the 
atomic weapons in its arsenal.  Further, atomic weapons, while destructive, were 
not seen as capable of significantly reducing Soviet War making capacity.13  The 
underlying logic, therefore was that the United States needed to improve not only 
its nuclear capabilities, but also increase its conventional forces and those of its 
allies in order to deter Soviet aggression.  Therefore, as the United States 
developed its nuclear and conventional forces for the potential war with the 
Soviets, the existing forces of the United States were left with the task of applying 
the current capabilities to attack the Soviet Union should they need to.  In 
summary, the United States would have to embark on a rearmament program 
both conventionally and by expanding the ability to deliver nuclear weapons. 
D. POLICY TO WAR PLAN 
The Joint Staff had begun to develop strategic plans to address various 
scenarios for conflict with the Soviet Union as early as 1946.  The JCS assessed, 
“that the Soviets were aggressive, and that Moscow was not simply seeking to 
 
11 Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1991) 
p. 107-108 
12 Ibid, p.115 
13 Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1991) 
p.119 
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create buffer zones around the USSR but was intent upon world domination.”14  
The JCS also understood that the conventional forces of the U.S. were 
insufficient in size to resist a Soviet attack and that, atomic weapons were the 
only “immediately effective weapon in the American arsenal.”15   
Initial concepts for war with the Soviets envisioned the expansion of a 
local incident into larger scale conflict.  The predominant geographic focus was 
on Europe and the Middle East, presuming Soviet desire for resources and 
industrial capacity.  These plans addressed the concepts for fighting the Soviets, 
but did so with no allowance for mobilization or sustainment of a force during an 
extended conflict.  Besides limited conventional and nuclear forces, an additional 
complicating factor for planners was the Truman administration’s contemplation 
of an international ban on nuclear weapons.   
The initial plans such as CHARIOTEER and BROILER, placed emphasis 
on atomic weapons, as Steven Ross writes: 
It became the centerpiece of American strategy, and the planners 
strongly implied that atomic warfare alone could be decisive in a 
war against Russia.  Shrinking forces and shrinking budgets 
convinced planners, that effective forward defense of Europe was 
not feasible.  Coupled with a belief in the effectiveness of air power 
loudly trumpeted by the Air Force, planners had to emphasize their 
most effective weapon.  Thus the A-bomb, despite its scarcity and 
severe limitations in delivery capability, took on an increasingly 
important role in American strategy.16
Early war plans focused on attacking Soviet industrial concentrations, the 
limiting factors being the stockpile size, delivery capability and inaccurate target 
information.  Even so, the use of atomic weapons on or near these targets was 
expected to degrade the industrial war making capacity of the Soviets and in 
killing large numbers of civilians, further reduce the ability of Soviet industry to 
 
14 Steven T. Ross, American War Plans 1945-1950 (London, Frank Cass, 1996) p.19 
15 Ibid, p.19 
16 Steven T. Ross, American War Plans 1945-1950 (London, Frank Cass, 1996) p.61 
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recover.  However, the expansion of the stockpile brought increased capability 
and added missions for the bombing force.  As David Rosenberg writes: 
The October 1949 target annex for Joint Outline Emergency War 
Plan OFFTACKLE called for attacks on 104 urban targets with 220 
atomic bombs, plus a re-attack reserve of 72 weapons.  The prime 
objective was still to disrupt the Soviet will to wage war.17
The Air Force clearly believed it could accomplish a war winning campaign 
against the Soviet interior, thereby obviating the need for a large force to defend 
Europe.  
The Joint Staff continued to develop its estimates for a strategic bombing 
campaign, estimates of Soviet capabilities and the priorities to address those 
capabilities.  The requirement to stop not only a Soviet advance in Europe or 
elsewhere, but also reduce their industrial war making capacity placed severe 
constraints on the planners flexibility.  The JCS eventually identified three 
priorities for atomic attack.  According to Rosenberg: 
The JCS formally assigned first priority to the destruction of known 
targets affecting Soviet capability to deliver atomic bombs. The 
retardation mission [attack of advancing Soviet armies in Europe] 
was given second priority because of the fleeting nature of the 
majority of major retardation targets.  Third priority was assigned to 
attacks on the Soviet liquid fuel, electric power and atomic energy 
industries.18
These plans showed a growing reliance on atomic weapons to fill a 
shortfall in conventional forces both in Europe and in other areas of possible 
Soviet advance. 
Atomic weapons were a central factor in U.S war planning throughout the 
early Cold War.  Despite their limitations, the weapons represented a critical 
capability for the JCS and U.S planners. The weapons also became markedly 
more powerful after the first hydrogen bomb was detonated in 1952. 
 
17 David Alan Rosenberg, The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 
1945-1960, International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Spring, 1983), p. 16 
18 Ibid, p.17 
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Improvements in the weapons’ destructive effect in turn required policy and 
planning adjustments.  The option of capitalizing on the U.S. nuclear superiority 
also was considered, the idea of preventive war had circulated through the 
government and the military.  The nation’s vulnerability to atomic weapons, 
forced consideration of a “first blow.”  As a 1952 NSC study identified: 
The controlling relationship in the atomic equation appears not to 
be that of stockpiles to each other, but rather the relationship of one 
stockpile, plus its deliverability, to the number of key enemy targets, 
including retaliatory facilities, which must be destroyed in order to 
warrant an attack.19
While the possibility of a preventive war was considered, the concept 
clearly was never placed into action.  Atomic weapons represented a centerpiece 
of U.S strategic thinking and policy.  Their use in a conflict was accepted as 
inevitable, even at the tactical level.  Yet, their true strength, in the view of the Air 
Force, lay in their strategic use against targets in the Soviet Union. 
E. DECISIVE AIR POWER  
The development of aircraft and subsequently air warfare doctrine has 
marked the latter part of the 20th century.  Combat aircraft have graduated from 
reconnaissance aids to decisive instruments of war, able to operate from the 
tactical to the strategic levels.  To this end, air power advocates such as General 
Billy Mitchell and Italian General Giulio Douhet  were viewed as “visionaries who 
saw air power as the decisive vehicle of future wars, superseding and rendering 
marginal or superfluous the clash of armies on the ground.”20  The creation of the 
United States Air Force, in 1947 was an extension of this thinking, tempered by 
the experience of the Second World War.   
Clearly, the Second World War supported the rapidly emerging technology 
of aircraft to include jets and missiles.   The United States with its huge 
technological base was able to produce on a massive scale, tactical and strategic 
 
19 Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1991) 
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aircraft as well as meet the requirements for ground and naval warfare.  As Carl 
Builder writes: 
Who is the Air Force?  It is the keeper and wielder of the decisive 
instruments of war-the technological marvels of flight that have 
been adapted to war.  What is it about?  It is about ensuring the 
independence of those who fly and launch these machines to have 
and use them for what they are- the ultimate means for both the 
freedom of flight and the destruction of war.21
Airpower had come of age during the World War II and the USAF saw as 
an absolute, its faith in air power and in particular the primacy of the heavy 
bomber and in general the technology of aircraft.   
The Air Force found itself in a unique position among the services as it 
was intellectually equipped to couple strategic bombing and nuclear weapons.  
The Air Force truly believed that bombers equipped with atomic weapons would 
be the ultimate solution to warfare.  Fortunately for the Air Force, during the late 
1940s and early 1950s, the only way to deliver these weapons was by heavy 
bomber.  Nevertheless, the early nuclear weapons were limited in numbers, 
outsized and heavy.  According to Steven Ross: 
The bomb stock stood at thirteen in 1947 and grew to fifty by 1948.  
The bombs were mostly Mark III models that weighed 10,300 
pounds and had a twenty-kiloton yield.  It took a specially trained 
thirty-nine-man team two days to assemble a bomb which could 
remain in its ready state for only forty-eight hours…22
Even so, the Air Force found itself the right service, at the right time with 
the right capability.  At the time, while long range, guided missiles were still being 
developed; bombers had proven their ability during the war and were the only 
sure way to deliver atomic weapons onto the Soviet Union.  The responsibility for 
this mission fell to a unique organization within the United States Air Force, the 
Strategic Air Command. 
 
21 Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis 
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F. THE STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND 
The Strategic Air Command or SAC was established March 21, 1946 and 
was the designated entity within the Air Force for operational planning and 
execution of US strategic air campaigns against the Soviet Union.  One of the 
early influential strategic thinkers, Bernard Brodie, began to look at both nuclear 
weapons and strategic bombing.  Brodie concluded, that “strategic bombing 
would be our chief offensive weapon” 23 in war with the Soviets.  Even though, 
large scale strategic bombing had been touted as a decisive strategy during 
World War II, studies afterwards showed this was not necessarily the case; for 
instance, “in 1944, the peak year of the Allied bombing effort, production of all 
German military hardware exceeded-in some instances-far exceeded-the output 
of previous war years when the bombing was not so intense.”24  Nuclear 
weapons changed that equation.   
SAC had the task of planning the employment of the nations limited 
number of nuclear weapons, for the most effect against the Soviet Union.  SAC 
“was both a separate major Air Force administrative command under the Air 
Force Chief of Staff and a specified command within the JCS national unified and 
specified command system.”25  SAC however, even though a new organization, 
was also a victim of the postwar drawdown with limited capabilities and 
personnel shortages.  The organization had America’s newest bomber the B-29, 
of which by 1948, only 32 were modified to carry atomic bombs; further, the B-29 
had a 2,000-mile range, which did not allow it to reach the Soviet Union form the 
continental United States.26  Although additional aircraft were coming into the air  
 
23 Ibid, p.37 
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1945-1960, International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Spring, 1983), p.10 
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force, to include the longer range B-36 and B-50, by 1949, SAC had 12127 
bombers with which to conduct an “atomic air offensive”28 against the Soviet 
Union.   
During this time, SAC was still a nascent force, capable of limited 
offensive operations, but growing as “the dominant force in operational planning 
for nuclear war.”29  This occurred nearly simultaneously with the creation and 
establishment of the USAF as a separate armed service and the Department of 
Defense as the head of the nation’s armed forces.  The first commander of SAC 
was General Curtis Lemay, who had commanded bombing operations against 
Japan. He would later become Chief of Staff of the Air Force.  Lemay held the 
position that  “the services [USAF] highest priority mission was to deliver the SAC 
atomic offensive, in one fell swoop telescoping mass and time.”30
In the late 1940s, the nation’s priorities were on drawdown of wartime 
forces and economic growth rather than conflict with the Soviet Union.  The 
budget decisions of the Truman administration, made large standing ground and 
naval forces unlikely, forcing the nation to rely on aerial delivery of atomic 
weapons as both a deterrent and a warfighting system.  The Air Force believed 
itself to be the only force able to deliver the nations nuclear weapons to the 
Soviet Union.  SAC was the mechanism to execute this concept.  Further, the 
position of SAC as a specified command with in the JCS system allowed SAC an 
advantage in achieving their procurement goals within the DoD.31   
The conflict in Korea proved useful and frustrating for SAC.  The 
command considered Korea “as an all-out training ground for the bigger issues 
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that loomed just over the Siberian horizons.”32  For SAC, Korea was a 
conventional bombing campaign against operational and tactical targets that 
proved good training for the crews; but there were few strategic targets in North 
Korea.  The targets SAC considered worthy were “off limits” in Manchuria, 
nevertheless SAC as an organization learned lessons and improved its skills 
during the three years of the Korean conflict.  The capability of SAC was 
demonstrated early on in the conflict, in that within nine days of alert, SAC units 
were flying combat mission in Korea compared to several months required in 
World War II.33
Korea also spurred the technological development of weapons systems; in 
particular, SAC began to receive the first jet bomber in the medium range B-47, 
followed by the more capable B-52.  Additionally, medium range missiles were in 
use and showed promise as longer-range systems.  By 1954, the Air Force was 
in receipt of 40 percent of the military budget, which allowed for a larger SAC 
force.34  By way of comparison, between 1941 and 1955, the United States Air 
Force had five major strategic bomber programs under development and that 
reached production (see Table 1).35  There were an additional seven programs 
that were studied and tested but not approved for production. 
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TABLE 1.   U.S. BOMBERS OF THE EARLY COLD WAR 
 
Program Began Ended Total Number 
Built 
B-36 1941 1954 366 
B-45 (Jet) 1944 1948 142 
B-47 (Jet) 1944 1957 1,923 
B-52 (Jet) 1946 1962 744 
B-58 (Jet) 1951 1962 116 
 
The reliance on nuclear weapons ensured the Air Force a preeminent role 
in defense and strategic planning.  A 1953 defense program identified three 
priorities based on the Eisenhower’s administrations “New Look,” the priorities: 
offensive striking power, tactical nuclear weapons and defense against nuclear 
attack.36  The first two priorities clearly benefited the Air Force with their tasking 
to attack the Soviet homeland as well as advancing Soviet armed forces.  This 
benefit was codified in the 1954-57 budgets, with the Air Force receiving 47 
percent of the defense budget while the Army received 22 and the Navy 29 
percent respectively.37
The increased budget allocation, certainly allowed the Air Force to 
increase force structure and acquire newer aircraft.  The Air Forces early 
bombers were World War II era B-29s, followed by an improved B-29 version, the 
B-50.  Another World War II era project was the B-36, a massive six engine, 
long-range bomber that never completely met expectations.  Advances in jet 
engines allowed for the development of long-range higher speed, jet bombers.   
The initial jet solution had been the medium range B-47 that although 
capable, relied on aerial refueling or bases closer to the Soviet Union, bases that 
could not be counted on once a conflict began.  The Air Force needed a bomber 
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that could strike from the continental United States.  Although this requirement 
had existed during World War II, its importance renewed as the Cold War 
progressed.  Range, payload and accuracy still defined a bomber’s effectiveness.   
The B-52, an improved version of the B-47 was next.  The B-52 was 
capable of reaching the Soviet Union from the United States.  However, as 
Soviet defensive technology improved, the prospect of high flying jet bombers 
penetrating Soviet airspace, began to seem less likely.  SAC moved towards 
faster airplanes, the supersonic B-58 and B-70.  Neither system provided a 
solution to a high probability penetration of Soviet airspace.  The B-58 lasted 
barely 10 years in service; the B-70 was cancelled before reaching operational 
service.  Improvements in the payload and accuracy of missiles also contributed 
to the decline of multiple SAC bombers. 
The Air Force clearly benefited from early fascination with the atomic 
bomb.  The Air Force having the background in strategic bombing, a new, 
destructive weapon and the only delivery system at the time was in a position to 
capitalize on the fear of the Soviet threat and provide the decisive instrument of 
retaliation in the event of conflict with them.  In a sense, the Air Force became 
totally focused on nuclear weapon delivery, some would argue even one-
dimensional as a service.  As Carl Builder writes: 
The Strategic Air Command (SAC’s) concept of war is an extension 
of the Air Forces experience in World War II with the bomber 
offensives and the “maximum effort” raids, only this time in the form 
of an all-out nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, one that 
invokes the Single integrated Operational Plan (SIOP).  This is the 
war that justifies the forces, plans, and procedures SAC has 
worked so long and hard to perfect.38
 
Although this perhaps overstates the case, the Air Force provided superb 
tactical air support to ground forces in Korea and later Vietnam.  Although in the 
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case of Vietnam, the Army found helicopter gunships as an organic close air 
support platform that avoided over reliance on and bureaucratic conflict with the 
Air Force.  In any case, the Air Force certainly viewed the atomic bomb and its 
delivery as the essential weapon for the essential mission; that role would define 
it as a service during the early Cold War and indeed throughout the Cold War.  
The Air Force however, was rather isolated in this position, strong though it was 
within the Defense establishment.  
G. EARLY COLD WAR NAVAL POWER 
The United States Navy emerged from World War II the predominant 
naval force in the world.  The Navy also was a transformed force.  The Navy had 
entered the war a predominantly battleship centric fleet, it had ended the war with 
aircraft carriers and submarines as its primary weapons platforms.  The aircraft 
carrier had the effect of expanding the effective range of a battleship.  The 
submarine was an effective blockading weapon as well as reconnaissance 
platform.  In fact, the Navy viewed its mission as essentially unchanged, that 
mission was command of the sea and the air above it.39  The Navy had 
transformed itself in the sense of its expanded surface, aerial and subsurface 
capabilities.  It is also useful to also describe the broader sense of the Navy.  As 
Carl Builder defines the Navy: 
Who is the Navy?  It is the supranational institution that has 
inherited the British Navy’s throne to naval supremacy.  What is it 
about?  It is about preserving and wielding sea power as the most 
important and flexible kind of military power for America as a 
maritime nation.  The means to those ends are the institution and 
its traditions, both of which provide a permanence beyond the 
people who serve them.40
 
The Navy viewed nuclear weapons and strategic bombing in a different 
light than the Air Force in terms of both policy and strategy.  The Navy saw the 
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newly formed Air Force as an opponent for a monopoly on air power assets.  
Historically, airpower advocates viewed Naval Aviation as an air asset that 
should be incorporated as part of a single independent air arm.  With the arrival 
of nuclear weapons and the supposed success of strategic bombing, the Air 
Force believed that victory in the next war would be achieved by a massive, 
sustained strategic atomic and conventional bombing campaign of the Soviet 
homeland.  Whereas the Navy believed that, the strategic bombing campaign 
was only one part of a greater scheme of defense of Europe and the resource 
areas of the Middle East.   
During the late 1940s, nuclear weapons delivery was becoming a key 
capability for the US military.  The Navy was quick to recognize this and moved 
to meet the requirement.  Then Under Secretary of the Navy, John L. Sullivan 
wrote to President Truman in 1946, “In order to enable Carrier Task Forces to 
deliver atomic bombs, it will be essential to modify the carrier aircraft and alter 
aircraft carriers…This will require advanced peacetime preparations.” 41  The 
challenge for the Navy at the time was much the same as for the Air Force; the 
current atomic weapons were outsized, heavy and complex devices that did not 
lend themselves to small airframes.  Nevertheless, the Navy undertook 
modifications to its largest carriers to operate larger aircraft with heavier bomb 
loads.42  Additionally, the Navy while adopting its ability to deliver atomic 
weapons was also looking at nuclear science as a basis for vessel propulsion 
systems. 
A concurrent dispute was occurring between the newly formed Air Force 
and the Navy over control of roles and missions.  The Navy saw its effort to adapt 
aircraft carriers and aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons as a logical expansion of 
capability not only to support Navy missions but the overall strategic needs of the 
nation.  The Air Force took the opposite view.  The Air Force viewed the Navy’s 
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carrier force as both a wasteful divergence of funds for a robust strategic air arm 
and a vulnerable and obsolete asset.  The Air Force regarded carriers as unable 
to effectively engage a land power such as the Soviet Union. The carriers 
vulnerability to both submarine and land based air attack coupled with the 
smaller delivery capability of carrier aircraft, reduced their usefulness in any 
strategic campaign.  In the end, the Navy and Air Force reached tenuous 
agreement on the role of naval aviation in atomic weapons delivery albeit “both 
for tactical purposes and, in assisting in the overall air offensive, for strategic 
purposes as well.”43
H. BOMBER AND SUPERCARRIER 
The debate over roles and missions also took place in the development of 
weapons systems.  In particular, the Air Force desired the B-36 bomber, whereas 
the Navy desired the so-called “supercarrier.”  Both systems represented an 
offensive capability for their respective services.  Each service saw the others 
system as inadequate to the future task of defeating the Soviet Union.     
The B-36 was a World War II design for a long-ranged heavy bomber (6 
pusher engines, 230 ft. wingspan, 163 ft. length) that could strike Europe from 
the continental US.44  The program was plagued by development problems and 
production priorities, which focused on already proven bombers then in service.  
The wars end did highlight the shortfalls of the B-29 and the accompanying need 
for forward bases.  Therefore, the B-36 program moved ahead and the aircraft 
entered service in 1948.  It was criticized immediately, as too big, too slow and 
vulnerable to the jet fighters then being developed by both sides.  Yet, to the Air 
Force, the B-36 represented a progression of strategic bombing and at the time, 
was the only intercontinental rage bomber available to the Air Force. 
Equally, the Navy had also realized the need to upgrade its fleet of aircraft 
carriers from the early World War II Midway class designs.  In late 1945, the 
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Navy had initiated studies of  “large, carrier-based bombers and a large aircraft 
carrier to operate them.”45  This eventually produced a design designated CVB-X 
(later 6A) which was intended to be a “single purpose, special type carrier, 
designed solely for conducting atomic strikes with 100,000-pound, long range 
attack aircraft.”46  The need for a larger, more advanced carrier was indicative of 
the Navy’s view of incorporating atomic weapons in strike operations and the 
need to enhance the overall effectiveness of aircraft carriers.  The intended 
targets would be on the periphery of the Soviet Union and other targets that 
supported naval operations.   
The opposition of the Air Force centered around the perception that with 
this new carrier, the Navy was intent on developing larger carriers and aircraft 
able to conduct strategic bombing.  Behind this thought, was the calculation that 
the money spent on the carrier, could be better used to improve and develop 
strategic bombers.   In the end, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson cancelled 
the new carrier and B-36 procurement continued.  Johnson was to maintain a 
pro-Air Force stance throughout his tenure from March 1949 to September 1950.  
This coupled with an overt effort by the Air Force to ensure its preeminence with 
in the United States military, created an antagonistic relationship among the 
services. 
Although the extended details of the inter-service conflict that took place 
during this time are beyond the scope of this document, it is necessary to note its 
occurrence.  The Air Force and Navy both coveted a larger share of a limited 
peacetime budget.  Both services faced the challenge of how best to face the 
new Cold War security environment.  These two services disagreed on strategy, 
role and missions further aggravated by the mandate to unify the services under 
a Department of Defense.  Service cultures, budgets and futures were at stake in 
the approval of their key projects of the early Cold War.  While the Air Force 
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emerged victorious, the Navy maintained its independence and air arm.  In both 
cases, the delivery of atomic weapons was at the heart of debate.  The service 
able to best do this would retain primacy in defense planning and thinking 
throughout the early Cold War. 
I. CONCLUSION 
Nuclear weapons certainly had an impact on both the Air Force and the 
Navy in the early Cold War years.  The impacts were different for each service.  
On one hand, the Air Force had emerged from World War II as an independent 
force committed to air power and the concept of strategic bombing.  On the other 
hand, the Navy, emerged from the war as a force changed from a predominantly 
battleship force to that of a carrier based force.  Further, the Air Force worked 
successfully to achieve dominance in US defense policy during this time.     
The development of nuclear weapons with their destructive economy, 
seemed tailor made for aerial bombardment.  The early nuclear weapons were 
bulky and heavy and therefore were deliverable at long-range only by large 
aircraft.  However, physics and engineering technology were continuing to refine 
weapons design to make them smaller and lighter.  Even so, the United States 
armed forces saw these weapons as critical to any war with the Russians.  This 
belief was critical in the early development of US war plans to attack the Soviet 
Union.  The Air Force believed that a massive, sustained aerial attack on the 
industrial and population targets in the Soviet Union, similar to those conducted 
against Germany and Japan during World War II would be the decisive action in 
a war. 
To this end, the Air Force created force structures-namely the Strategic Air 
Command (SAC) which had the sole mission of strategic attack of the Soviet 
Union.  Furthermore, the Air Force embarked on a strategic bomber production 
program throughout the early years of the Cold War.  Further, the Air Force 
received increasing proportions of defense budgets, even during the fiscal 
constraints of post World War II.  In addition to increased budgets and aircraft 
development, the Air Force defined U.S strategic thinking during the early Cold 
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War.  The missions to attack the Soviet war making industry, atomic delivery 
capability and retard a Soviet advance into Western Europe, were developed by 
the same planners and thinker that had fought the strategic bombing campaign of 
World War II.  This primacy for the Air Force was the result of a convergence of 
technology, capability and geopolitics. 
By comparison, the Navy viewed atomic weapons as a useful tool in their 
arsenal that could be used in a conflict with the Soviets.  The Navy was not 
committed to the concept of strategic bombing like the Air Force.  The Navy 
viewed the Air Force mission, as a part of a much broader operation the US 
would need to conduct against the Soviets.  However, as the Air Force began to 
garner a greater share of defense budgets and dominance in strategic planning, 
the Navy began to develop an atomic delivery capability. 
This development took shape in the form of a new fleet of larger aircraft 
carriers that could accommodate larger aircraft capable of carrying the atomic 
bomb and the new jet aircraft.  The Air Force saw this development as a threat to 
not only its primacy in strategic bombing, but to its budget priorities.  Although the 
Navy never intended to usurp the Air Force role of strategic bombing, this was 
the perception.  During the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the 
Department of Defense had limits to what budget could be expended on 
expensive weapons systems.  In this event, the Navy lost its new aircraft carrier 
to the Air Forces B-36 bomber.  The Navy also was challenged for its entire 
aviation fleet, to be incorporated into the Air Force, to create a completely 
independent air arm.  This change did not occur and the Navy retained its air 
fleet.   
Nevertheless, as the Korean conflict improved military budgets, the Navy 
was able to develop new carriers and aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons.  
Further, the Navy embraced nuclear science as a propulsion system for ships 
and submarines.  Nuclear weapons represented a challenge for the Navy, as 
they almost represented the demise of the Navy that had won the Second World 
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War, the weapons also had the effect of reducing the Navy’s traditional position 
as a dominant service in the nations political and security thinking.  
In both cases, nuclear weapons represented changes for the Navy and Air 
Force.  The early Cold War also represented a change for the United States in it 
role in geopolitics.  The prospect of having to fight a numerically superior Soviet 
Union on multiple fronts around the world required a force capable of restricting 
their ability to wage war.  The Air Force’s strategic bombers, coupled with atomic 
weapons represented that force.  That force could have been complimented with 
an enhanced Naval air arm, however, jealously over expanded budget and fear 
of reduced roles and mission squandered that opportunity. Nuclear weapons 
affected the Navy and Air Force in vastly different ways and not in a uniformly 
positive manner.  In the early Cold War, the Air Force was able to develop a vast, 
technologically superior strategic bombing force.  The Navy spent much of that 
same period, fighting for its very existence.  The transformation for these 
services was either immaculate in nature or brutal in its potential impact.  This 
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III. THE ARMY’S ATOMIC FORCE STRUCTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The US Army emerged from World War II as an experienced combined 
arms force.  The Army’s equipment, organizations and doctrine reflected the 
expertise learned during four years of conflict in both Europe and the Pacific.  
However, in the years immediately after the end of the war, the Army much like 
the other services, rushed to reduce its numbers.  The Army had the primary 
mission of constabulary duty in Germany and Japan, helping to rebuild these 
countries.  Moreover, World War II had seen the maturation of airpower as a 
combat arm and its definitive demonstration in the use of two atomic bombs on 
Japanese cities. 
The uniting of airpower, in particular heavy bombers, and the atomic bomb 
seemed to herald a new era of warfare.  The atomic bomb was indeed a new 
weapon of immense destructive power and strategists and leaders both political 
and military were still learning its potential.  The thinking ranged from a weapon 
that would end all life on earth, to simply another larger explosive device.  For 
certain, atomic weapons represented an increase in destructive economy, what 
took several hundred bombers with thousands of high explosive bombs to do in 
World War II, now took one bomber with one weapon.  The emergence of the 
new weapon was soon followed by the creation of an independent air force, and 
some observers thought that this portended the primacy of air power over land 
power.  The Army for its part wanted to learn what nuclear weapons could mean 
for tactical use and for the Army’s role in National Strategy.   
The Army, saw the destructive force of the new weapon, yet understood 
that in the immediate post war period, the weapons could only be delivered by 
heavy bombers, aircraft the army no longer had.  Converting its utility to tactical 
purposes was a prime concern.  Nevertheless, the Army faced a larger problem 
during this period with regard to atomic weapons.  This problem was primarily a 
bureaucratic one, specifically, “It was the prevention of an Air Force atomic 
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monopoly, rather than a quest for some specific battlefield capability, that 
became the Army’s nuclear “problem” of the late 1940s.”47  However, this 
concern would be quickly overshadowed by another more pressing concern, that 
of winning in the conflict in Korea.  
Of equal and perhaps greater concern, the Army faced a new National 
Security Strategy centered on nuclear weapons.  The Eisenhower Administration 
unquestionably was in favor of a strategic attack against the Soviet Union with 
atomic weapons in certain circumstances.  This intention remained in spite of 
Army reservations about the efficacy of that strategy.  The Army’s opposition 
notwithstanding, Eisenhower remained unconvinced, stating that “a major war 
will be an atomic war and the army’s role in such a war would be to maintain 
order in the aftermath.”48  Of course, the Eisenhower administration was first in 
favor of deterrence of Soviet actions.   
The Korean War while not a nuclear conflict, provided the Army the first 
opportunity for a new type of combat that it had not faced in World War II.  In 
Korea, the Army faced a massed infantry army as opposed to a blend of infantry 
and armored forces such as the Germans had utilized.  This new threat, coupled 
with the Army’s initial unpreparedness to fight, created a dangerous situation that 
required the application of massed firepower, tactical skill in its soldiers and 
leaders and undoubtedly luck to avert disaster.  The conflict in Korea also saw 
the first opportunity for atomic weapons use in an operational or tactical combat 
environment.   
This Chapter will provide an analysis of the Army’s efforts to adjust to the 
realities of combat in Korea.  Although the conflict in Korea is not the focus of this 
thesis, it is an essential part of the context of the Army’s efforts in the early Cold 
War.  Second, this chapter will look at what types of atomic delivery systems the 
 
47 John J. Midgely, Jr., Deadly Illusions: Army Policy for the Nuclear Battlefield (Boulder, CO, 
Westview Press, 1986), p.2 
48 As quoted in A.J. Bacevich, The PENTOMIC Era: The U.S. Army between Korea and 
Vietnam (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1986), p.39 
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Army sought and how the Army adopted atomic weapons into its force structure.  
A subsequent chapter will review in detail, the doctrinal impacts of atomic 
weapons for the Army.  Finally, this chapter will look at the Army’s political and 
interservice conflicts with the Eisenhower administration and the Air Force over 
strategy, roles and missions during this period.   
B. THE KOREAN CONFLICT  
June 1950, found the United States military, in particular the Army, 
unprepared for combat on the Korean peninsula.  The conflict in Korea was 
somewhat a surprise; not only in the North Korean attack, but also in that the US 
decided to respond in Korea.  The U.S. military response over Korea was 
unexpected especially after Korea had been removed from US security strategy.  
Nevertheless, the US decided to defend South Korea with a land force that until 
then was focused on constabulary duty in Japan.  The North Korean Army 
savaged the initial American ground force into Korea, Task Force Smith.  Task 
Force Smith came to represent the failure of the post-World War II Army.  
Interestingly, at the end of the Cold War and following Operation Desert Storm, 
“No More Task Force Smith’s” became Chief of Staff of the Army General 
Gordon Sullivan’s rally cry against apathy in the ranks.  The lesson of an 
unprepared, under trained and inadequately armed force had a long life within 
the Army. 
The Army entered the Korean conflict with a force structure of ten combat 
divisions, five separate regimental combat teams and a total strength of 
591,000.49  Further, these units were generally under strength, not trained or 
ready for combat and equipped with World War II equipment, which while 
functioning was inadequate for the tasks in Korea.  In fact, the Army had decided 
to adjust its brigade and battalion level unit structure in order to retain its 10-
division force structure.50  In essence, regiments or brigades went from three 
 
49 Allen Millet and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense (New York, The Free Press, 
1984) p. 491  
50 David T. Fautua, The “Long Pull” Army: NSC-68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the 
Cold War U.S. Army, (The Journal of Military History, Vol. 61, No. 1, Jan. 1997), p.99 
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battalions to two, with the battalions under strength from 100% of authorized 
personnel.51  Since the end of the war, there had been no significant 
modernization of the Army.  With the exception of food, clothing and medical 
supplies, the Army had not procured any new equipment for its units.52  
It was in this state that the Army entered the Korean conflict in 1950.  As 
COL Arthur Conner points out: 
Of the 3,202 medium “Sherman” tanks in the United States in 1950, 
1,326 were unserviceable.  [For the Eighth Army in Japan] 
Authorized 221 recoilless rifles, Eighth Army fielded only 21.  While 
13,780 two-and-a-half-ton trucks were on hand, only 4,441 were in 
running condition; of the 18,00 “jeeps” in the command, 10,000 
were unserviceable.53
These figures indicate multiple shortfalls for the Army.  First, old 
equipment that had not been overhauled or refurbished since the end of the war, 
second, certainly a budget that allowed for only a portion of equipment to be 
properly maintained or allowed for new equipment to be procured and third, and 
perhaps most important, an absence of leadership to set priorities and focus 
efforts. 
In Korea, the Army found itself fighting a conflict unlike any in its recent 
experience.  The Army’s latest combat had been its large-scale offensives in 
Europe and the Pacific during World War II.  In Korea and indeed Europe, the 
Army was fighting or preparing to fight a continual defense across a wide 
frontage with limited units.54  This coupled with general lack of combat 
experience led to initial failures of Army units.  The Army rapidly recovered and 
 
51 Major Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76, 
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54 Major Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76, 
Leavenworth Papers (Leavenworth KS, Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and 
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relearned the lessons of combat.  Senior leaders and units began to develop 
tactics appropriate to the environment and adjust to the environment in Korea.  
Further, as industry geared up to support the conflict, improved weapons and 
technology eventually began to arrive in theater.  
The initial weeks of the conflict saw the US Army defending all the way 
down the Korean peninsula.  Then counterattacking back up the peninsula to 
near the Chinese border by the end of 1950.  As the conflict continued, the 
Chinese intervention led to mass attacks or “human wave” style attacks against 
US units.  The Army found itself relying on the massed firepower of infantry and 
artillery occasionally aided by armor.  This position was not the expected 
operational or tactical environment the Army envisioned.  The Army 
predominantly expected to fight a massed armored formation in “tank country” 
which it identified as the plains of Northern and Central Europe; the geography 
there offered open and extended fields of fire for tank cannon.  Yet, in Korea, the 
Army found itself facing an enemy in the North Korean and Chinese armies, 
which fought as an infantry and artillery-centered force and did so in constricted 
and canalized terrain.  This as opposed to an armored centric force and more 
open terrain such as it expected to face in the Soviet Army in Europe.  Fighting 
an infantry centric force requires massive firepower such as provided by well-
equipped infantry, massed artillery and air power and a sound defensive 
doctrine.  Whereas fighting an armored centric force primarily requires other 
armor although backed by the same massed artillery and air power.  
In some cases in Korea, tanks were used as supplemental artillery 
systems, with large dirt ramps being constructed at given angles of elevation.  
The tanks were then driven on to these ramps and used to augment regular field 
artillery pieces.  However, the use of field artillery became critical in defeating the 
North Koreans and later the Chinese forces.  The use of artillery to aid in 
defensive operations was especially insightful.  As Major Robert Doughty points 
out: 
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In Korea, it was not unusual to have massed fire from as many as 
14 battalions, with each firing 10 volleys within the space of two 
minutes.  In one operation, the 38th Field Artillery Battalion fired 
11,600 rounds in 12 hours, a rate of one round per minute per 
105mm howitzer.55
The coordinated and integrated use of artillery and infantry to conduct 
effective defenses was a highlight of the Army’s success in Korea.  In another 
example, the battle for Porkchop Hill in April 1953 saw nine filed artillery 
battalions fire 37,000 rounds in one 24-hour period.56  Although this massed use 
of artillery placed strains on the supply system, the tactics’ success reaffirmed its 
utility in commander’s minds.  Massed firepower ruled the battlefield.  This 
reliance on massive firepower either delivered by artillery or by airpower, has 
remained relatively unchanged even today.  Of course, with today’s technological 
enhancements that allow greater accuracy, the need for a massive supply line is 
somewhat reduced.  Certainly, the Korean experience reinforced the 
effectiveness of a defensive doctrine coupled with mass firepower, even at the 
expense of the ability to effectively maneuver or sustain an offensive. 
However, it is interesting to note, the war in Korea was in a way a 
blueprint for the war the Army expected to fight in Europe.  The Eighth Army in 
Korea was created to fight the conflict in Korea (and remains so today), to defeat 
the North Korean and Chinese Armed forces and to a bigger purpose show US 
resolve to defeat Communism.  Whereas the Seventh Army in Germany was 
“purposely constructed to fight a long, tough-and expensive- battle against the 
Soviets and their Communist ideology.”57  The Seventh Army was a symbol of 
U.S. commitment to Europe and a manifestation of U.S. and Western values and 
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resolve.  In both cases, the Army envisioned a primarily defensive conflict; in 
essence, a smaller US Army facing a numerically superior enemy, this because 
of a National Strategy that relied less on ground forces and more on airpower 
and nuclear weapons.  The primary difference between Korea and Europe, being 
the Korean and later Chinese reliance on massed infantry supported by tanks 
versus the Soviet reliance on massed numbers of tanks and artillery supported 
by infantry.  The prospect of fighting a massed Soviet armored formation in 
Germany and Western Europe retained a prime position in the defense and 
foreign policy thinking of the U.S. Army. 
With the conflict in Korea and the potential for conflict in Europe, the Army 
had long been thinking about how it might utilize atomic weapons in combat.  As 
mentioned above, the reliance of the U.S. Army on artillery during combat in 
Korea leads to the possibility of substituting an atomic weapon for massed 
artillery.  Of course, the main drawback of the early atomic devices was their 
size, weight and complexity.  Additionally, the need for a heavy bomber to deliver 
the device, made their rapid use somewhat problematic.  The rapidly changing 
tactical situation meant the ground commander would need instant 
communications with the aircraft and the armed aircraft loitering overhead on a 
constant basis.  Further, atomic weapons effects were classified, so both the Air 
Force and Army were unable to develop guidelines for effective use in tactical 
situations.  Therefore, with this in mind and overlaid with the experience in Korea, 
the Army increased its study of the weapon and its possible use on the 
battlefield. 
During the Korean conflict, the Army had rushed the production of 
numerous new weapons systems.  This included new tanks, helicopters and 
numerous other battlefield systems.  The Army had certainly reinforced the belief 
in the superiority of massed artillery in support of defensive positions.  Starting in 
1951, the Army rapidly developed new self-propelled artillery systems in 105mm, 
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155mm and 203mm (8-inch) calibers to improve its fire support capability.58  
Although these systems represented improvements, the Army also began to look 
at atomic weapons as the true equalizer it needed.  The conflict in Korea and the 
expected one in Europe had reinforced within the Army the belief that massed 
firepower would be needed to offset a numerically superior enemy. 
As mentioned above, the tactical situation in Korea had proved difficult for 
the introduction of an atomic weapon.  General MacArthur had been queried as 
to the possible use of atomic weapons.  He saw the weapons as useful in 
isolating Chinese forces in North Korea if the Chinese entered the conflict.59  
MacArthur had viewed the weapons as useful at the operational level as a way to 
separate echelons of enemy forces and restrict their movement by creating 
radiated areas that Chinese forces were unequipped to cross.  In fact, the Army 
had sent a team to the Far Eastern Command (FECOM) to study the possibility 
of employing an atomic weapon.  The study found the following: 
 
a. The policies, procedures, and the means available for 
Operation “Hudson Harbor” were inadequate for 
successful tactical employment of atomic weapons. 
b. Timely identification of large masses of enemy troops has 
been extremely rare. 
c. Troops in the forward areas are, in general, dug-in in 
such a manner as to be afforded protection from airburst 
of atomic weapon.60 
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The Army once more understood that an air delivered atomic weapon 
presented tactical and operational challenges for ground commanders.  This 
challenge was certainly exacerbated by continued friction with the Air Force over 
target selection and control of air support.  The lack of accurate data on weapons 
effects also presented problems for both services.  The comment that troops in 
forward areas would be protected was undoubtedly based more on supposition 
than on clear understanding of effects. 
The tactical and operational difficulty of using an atomic weapon, coupled 
with the inter service conflicts over use of the weapon presented the Army a 
clearer path.  The team sent to FECOM also made another recommendation for 
the Army: 
That the Army, as a matter of the utmost urgency, develop a 
ground-to-ground vehicle, within its own organization, which will 
effectively deliver atomic missiles within range adequate for support 
of ground operations, and that a proportionate number of such 
weapons be provided to Far Eastern Command.61
This recommendation certainly reinforced decisions already taken or 
under consideration within the Army.  The Army had begun development of an 
atomic cannon in the summer of 1950, although it was not tested until May 1953, 
after the cease-fire in Korea.62  Nevertheless, the Army had begun to develop its 
nuclear capable forces, which would significantly shape the Army throughout the 
Cold War, but certainly in the 1950s. 
C. ARMY NUCLEAR FORCES 
Combining the lessons of Korea with the anticipated conflict in Europe, the 
Army began in earnest to develop an atomic delivery capability.  This capability 
was accompanied by increasing study within the Army about how the use atomic 
weapons.  Throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Army and other 
services studied the possible scenarios and uses for atomic weapons.  The Army 
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became focused on the integration of atomic weapons onto the battlefield, based 
in large part on its experience in the Korean conflict; although the realities of 
budget and Defense policies were also a significant consideration.   
For the Army, the intense study was primarily centered at the Command 
and General Staff College (CGSC) at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.  Senior officers 
and students alike began to grapple with how these weapons might be used on 
the battlefield and the lessons from Korea were incorporated as well.  One of the 
first published studies from CGSC was entitled “Atomic Weapons in Land 
Combat” by Colonel G.C. Reinhardt and Lieutenant Colonel W.R. Kintner.63  This 
paper was the beginning of a wave of professional military writing on the subject.  
As John P. Rose points out: 
The Army recognized that a dynamic change had occurred in the 
military environment with the advent of atomic technology and that 
it must think anew if it were to respond anew.  In their writings, 
military officers developed and debated notions of ground combat 
operations on an atomic battlefield primarily in terms of firepower 
and mobility….  Answers varied.  Attempts to assess the change 
that atomic weapons cause on the battlefield were interpretive and 
encompassed the interaction between firepower, mobility, and 
dispersion.64
Of course, any new technology introduced onto the battlefield affects the 
interaction of firepower, mobility and dispersion.  Yet coupled with the lessons of 
reliance on firepower from Korea, the Army certainly believed that atomic 
weapons were a significant answer to that problem.  It is also interesting to note 
the amount of writing increased as the conflict in Korea continued and as 
awareness of atomic weapons possible use there or elsewhere increased.  In the 
period from 1950 to 1954, the CGSC Professional Journal Military Review 
published 32 articles on atomic weapons in warfare; correspondingly, the period 
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1955 to 1959 saw 132 articles published.65  The Eisenhower Administrations 
reliance on “massive retaliation” no doubt contributed to this amount of writing, 
even though the Army was not envisioned as the executor of the concept.   
Nonetheless, the Army was developing a set of doctrinal principles for the 
atomic battlefield.  As John Midgley found in a 1953 Army Training Circular 
entitled Staff Organization and Procedure for Tactical Employment of Atomic 
Weapons:  
Atomic weapons prepare the way by creating casualties and 
confusion.  The battle is won by maneuver.  It is necessary that 
atomic weapons be regarded as a gigantic preparation, but only as 
a preparation, and that the exploitation by maneuver be regarded 
as the major element of the battle plan.66
This concept although written in 1953, looks stunningly similar to the 
general concept of maneuver from World War I.  It was with this operational and 
tactical concept in mind that the Army expanded its weapons development.  As 
mentioned above, the Army’s atomic cannon was the first effort at a ground 
based delivery system.   
The atomic artillery concept had actually begun during World War II, 
although it had obviously not become a reality given the size of the actual atomic 
weapons then.  However, as atomic weapons technology developed, the Army 
revisited the possibility.  The atomic artillery was a 280mm cannon (nicknamed 
Atomic Annie) and was designed to fire both conventional high explosive and 
atomic artillery ammunition.  The gun did successfully fire an atomic shell at 
Frenchmen’s Flat, Nevada in May 1953.67  The system although not ready in 
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time for Korea, still represented the Army’s first atomic delivery capability, a 
critical asset within the Army’s control and not that of the Air Force. 
The atomic cannon, however, did not provide the ultimate solution for the 
Army’s concept of the atomic battlefield.  The gun system had a range of only 
30,000 yards, short of the desired 45,000 yards; further, the system was complex 
to operate and required two days to properly emplace.68  The gun was a 
technological achievement but not tactically or operationally useful.  All said the 
atomic gun gave the Army an initial capability, but one that fell short of its 
expectations.  Cannon artillery was and still is limited by range, its redeeming 
qualities being its rate of fire and variety of munitions in comparison to aircraft 
delivered weapons.  The range limitation coupled with technological limitations of 
making an atomic artillery shell into the 155mm or 203mm (8-inch) shell size, 
limited the Army’s options in this area.  The Army did pursue cannon delivered 
atomic munitions throughout the Cold War, although the prime years of service 
are beyond the scope of this paper, the chart is provided for comparison: 
 
TABLE 2.   US ARMY CANNON DELIVERY SYSTEM (NUCLEAR CAPABLE)69 
 









18km 1963- Still in 
service 
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Given the limitation of cannon delivered systems, the Army simultaneously 
turned to free-flight rockets and guided missiles.  The Army began to develop a 
wide range of rockets and missiles, in an attempt to provide additional firepower 
for commanders in Korea.  The conflict in Korea came to end before any of these 
newly developed system could be employed.  Nevertheless, the Army forged 
ahead with development of a variety of surface-to-surface rocket and missile 
systems.  As the chart below illustrates, the Army developed rocket and missile 
systems throughout the Cold War: 
TABLE 3.   US ARMY ROCKET & MISSILE SYSTEMS 1953-199170 
 
System Munitions Range Service Dates 
Corporal (Rocket) High Explosive  138 km 1953-1964 
Honest John (Rocket) High Explosive & 
Nuclear 
38 km 1954-1972 
Little John (Rocket) Nuclear 16 km 1954-1964 
Redstone (Rocket) Nuclear 400km 1958-1964 
Sergeant (Rocket) High Explosive & 
Nuclear 
140km 1961-1972 
Pershing 1 & 1A 
(Missile) 
Nuclear 740km 1962-1978 
Pershing 2 (Missile) Nuclear 1,800 km 1983-1991 
Lance (Missile) High Explosive & 
Nuclear 
91 km 1972-1991 
 
The early development of rockets gave the Army and expanded set of 
capabilities, over the atomic cannon.  However, these systems also had their 
drawbacks, in particular complexity, responsiveness and accuracy.  The Corporal 
and Redstone missiles were liquid propelled and complex in preparation for 
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firing.  The Honest John and Little John system were solid fuel, free flight rockets 
and so while more responsive and easier to fire, they were inaccurate.71   
Concurrently, the Army had begun to take an active role in air defense of 
the continental United States, which further fed the desire for rocket systems.  
The Army had developed several surface-to-air missile systems designed to 
protect the country from Soviet bombers.  In all cases, the Army’s cannon, rocket 
and missile systems represented a large-scale, long-term investment of its 
budget.  Of course, this desire for rockets and missiles with ever increasing 
range and the ability to fulfill several roles also was viewed as a threat by the Air 
Force.   
The Army and Air Force conflict over missile systems were symbolic of the 
era for the Army.  The Air Force saw the Army’s long-range missiles and rockets 
as encroaching on its “strategic” mission.  As A.J. Bacevich discusses: 
In terms of missions and claims on the defense budget, however, 
the Army’s acquisition of long-range missiles would occur at Air 
Force expense.  Despite the Air Force’s comparative robustness 
throughout the post-Korea era, that service had no intention of 
allowing the Army anything that even resembled a strategic 
weapon.  Successful Army missile initiatives could undercut the 
rationale for Air Force bomber or missile programs.72
These conflicts added to the Army’s increasing isolation in the Eisenhower 
Administration.  The administrations “New Look” placed a high value on regaining 
control of defense expenditures after Korea.  The “New Look” relied, in COL 
Arthur Connors words, “on an expanded strategic air force and reliance on 
technology, which allowed for a severe reduction in conventional forces.”73  Even 
so, the Army continued to develop weapons systems that could deliver atomic 
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weapons and began to look at changes in its unit force structure and 
organization.  The Army was investing a bulk of its funding into missiles and 
other related systems and consequently allowing “its needs for improved 
conventional equipment to go unfulfilled,”74 However, the Army did undertake a 
significant reorganization of its forces. 
Several senior commanders had decried the still in force World War II era 
unit organizations.  Major General James M. Gavin reinforced the conclusion, 
after war games in Europe, that “it was necessary to redesign the infantry 
division into relatively autonomous and widely dispersed “battle groups”, each 
one capable of sustained combat on its own.”75  The Army conducted several 
other studies with a view towards combat on an atomic battlefield.  The result of 
these experiments was known as the “PENTOMIC” division.  The PENTOMIC 
concept was so named because it was centered on multiples of five units within 
the divisional structure. 
The PENTOMIC reorganization of the Army began with the 101st Airborne 
Division in September 1956.76  The PENTOMIC division consisted of five battle 
or combat groups with five companies in each group and each company with five 
platoons.77  The five battle groups were intended to be self-sustaining in combat, 
as the concept of operations had these groups widely dispersed on the 
battlefield.  The PENTOMIC structure also provided the division with an Honest 
John rocket battery and eventually 203mm or 8-inch howitzers to deliver atomic  
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or conventional munitions.78  It was in the PENTOMIC division’s concept of 
operation, and subsequently the organization that problems for the Army rapidly 
emerged. 
The PENTOMIC concept envisioned the unit operating on a broader 
battlefield than had previously been experienced.  Specifically, the belief that in 
the future, the use of atomic weapons by both sides would require dispersed 
units.  Broad frontages for defense were expected, hence the need for self-
sustainment by units.  Further, the Army envisioned units with the ability to fight 
on both a nuclear and non-nuclear battlefield.  Chief of Staff Maxwell Taylor told 
Army leaders in February 1957 that “The Army had to be prepared to prevent or 
stop a small war as well as conduct a nuclear conflict.“79  The specifics of 
doctrinal thought to include the PENTOMIC Division concept of operation during 
this time will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.  
The PENTOMIC structure was applied across the Army throughout the 
late 1950s.  The Army completed PENTOMIC reorganization in 1960 settling with 
14 active duty divisions with one of two designations, infantry or airborne; 
armored divisions retained a more traditional structure.80  The PENTOMIC 
structure had shortfalls in both its conceptual foundation and the actual 
implications of the structure.  A RAND study of the evolution of Army divisions 
points out: 
The battalion-size battle groups did not possess sustainable 
combat power, while shortcomings in mobility and logistical assets 
also left the division ineffective.  The division did not possess 
enough vehicles to fulfill the Pentomic doctrinal concepts of timely 
massing and dispersion of forces….  In the end, Pentomic division 
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organization was unwieldy and unmanageable and proved to be 
less than robust vis-à-vis task organizing to suit specific missions.81
The PENTOMIC structure was intended for the Army to fill a role on a 
nuclear battlefield in light of ‘Massive Retaliation’ type strategic thinking.  This 
wholesale Army effort occurred in spite of the fact that the Army fundamentally 
disagreed with the concept of ‘Massive Retaliation’.  As Maxwell Taylor pointed 
out in his memoirs, “Massive retaliation could offer our leaders only two choices, 
the initiation of general nuclear war or compromise and retreat.”82  Of course, 
‘Massive Retaliation’ certainly placed the Air Force in a powerful position with in 
the Defense Department.  This further forced the Army to make decisions and 
adopt policies designed to justify its existence in relation to the Air Force.  
D. CONFLICTS 
‘Massive Retaliation’ clearly placed a large emphasis on strategic airpower 
to deliver an atomic strike on the Soviet Union.  The Air Force and specifically the 
Strategic Air Command certainly benefited from the policy.  The administration’s 
reliance on the deterrent value of an atomic offensive meant that it could reduce 
defense expenditures in other areas; clearly reducing manpower in the Army was 
an easy target for budget reductions.  Of course, the Army resisted this line of 
thinking because it rejected the foundation of ‘Massive Retaliation’ to begin with.  
The Army saw the distinct possibility that Soviet aggression would take place 
without nuclear weapons, such as it had in Korea.  So reducing the Army’s size 
and budget would place it in a position similar to that which it had found itself in 
1950.  
The Eisenhower administration had articulated in NSC 162/2 that both 
tactical and strategic nuclear weapons were to be considered for use when 
“militarily desirable”.83  The affect of this document however, went further, in that 
 
81 Richard W. Kedzior, Evolution and Endurance: The US Army Division in the Twentieth 
Century, (Santa Monica CA, RAND, Arroyo Center, 2000) p. 27 
82 Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1959) p.5 
83 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy 
and Policy (Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1973) p. 402 
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it called for an expansion of the Air Force.  The Air Force was to grow to 137 
wings with 54 of them in the Strategic Air Command.84  Nevertheless, the 
technological advent of ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons coupled with their prominence 
in a National Security document was certainly seized upon by the Army as a way 
to define relevance for itself during this time.  As General Taylor had pointed out, 
“nuclear weapons were the going thing and, by including some in the division 
armament, the Army staked out its claim to a share of the nuclear arsenal.”85   
However, in acquiescing to the need for nuclear forces, the Army was 
facing up to the realities that despite its resistance to ‘Massive Retaliation’, it was 
unable to convince the administration or the other services of the foundation of 
that resistance.  Namely the resistance centered on the concept that the military 
and specifically the Army must think beyond an all-out nuclear exchange and 
prepare not only for preventing war but also other lesser conventional 
contingencies. 
This thinking was clearly in opposition to the administration and for the Air 
Force, a threat to its stature and budget within that administration.  General 
Mathew Ridgeway had been the first Army Chief of Staff to oppose the 
administration’s policy both privately and publicly.  His efforts had almost no 
effect on the administration or within the services.  General Maxwell Taylor took 
up these misgivings, when he became Chief of Staff.  Taylor, as pointed out 
above, was still opposed to the course the Eisenhower administration had set 
out, but was not about to punish the entire Army over his opposition.  Taylor 
advocated a concept of ‘Flexible Response’, which Taylor describes in his 
memoirs as “the need for a capability to react across the entire spectrum of 
possible challenge, for coping with anything from general atomic war to 
infiltrations and aggressions…”86.  General Taylor also tried to persuade his 
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fellow service chiefs and the administration against a strategy relying only on 
nuclear weapons.  He was unsuccessful; he then took his concerns public in the 
form of testimony before the Senate in 1958, saying  “he found the Army at less 
than adequate readiness to counter possible Communist challenges”.87  This 
along with his previous disagreement forced Taylor’s retirement. 
This conflict between the Army and both the Eisenhower administration 
and the other services occurred as both strategies, budgets and service doctrine 
all conjoined over the emerging reality of the Cold War.  This Cold War reality 
included events such as the US conflict in Korea, the French involvement in 
Vietnam (and possible US involvement) and continuing Communist actions 
throughout Eastern Europe.  The Army certainly drew different conclusions about 
these events than seemingly the administration did.  The Army saw its position 
on the need for conventional and nuclear capable ground forces reinforced by 
these events, whereas others seemed to view them as anomalies not to distract 
from the greater albeit potential strategic atomic campaign envisioned.  During 
this period, the Army pursued nuclear capabilities as both a self-preserving act to 
retain a portion of budget relevance and as an acknowledgement of the realities 
of the “atomic age” and the need for military forces to deter conflict.   
E. CONCLUSION 
The Army’s evolution during from 1950 to 1957 was a troubling period that 
saw the Army with out direction and embracing technology it did not truly accept 
in support of a strategy it did not truly agree with.  The Army’s experience in 
Korea found it initially unprepared for any conflict much less the one it ultimately 
faced there.  However, the Army was able to adjust to the tactical and operational 
realities of combat against a massed infantry and artillery-based army.  Yet it 
also found that the supposedly “absolute” weapon was not even a factor, due in 
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part to a lack of political will to use it and in part a scarcity of useful targets or 
effective procedures to attack those targets.   
Nevertheless, the Army rapidly began to embrace atomic weapons and 
their associated delivery systems as a way to retain relevance in an increasingly 
airpower dominated strategic military culture.  The concept of “massive 
retaliation” concentrated much of its conceptual and political effort in the large-
scale use of strategic airpower and atomic weapons against the Soviet Union in 
the event of Soviet aggression.  In this instance, the nation’s military strategy was 
driven by technology.  The Army felt the concept of ‘massive retaliation’ removed 
from possibility any other strategic options for the country’s leaders and indeed 
the military.  Even so, the Army’s objections to this thinking found no sway with 
the Eisenhower administration, which continued on this course and its resultant 
defense and budgetary policy.   
Consequently, the Army embarked on an internal series of changes that 
lacked long-term direction and resulted in short term and rather cosmetic 
changes to the force.  The Army embraced atomic weapons in part to retain a 
share of the defense budget and to preserve legitimacy, by articulating a need for 
atomic weapons at the operational and tactical levels for potential use against 
Soviet forces.  The changes to its force structure in the form of the PENTOMIC 
division were an attempt to meld atomic weapons and capability as well as 
conventional force capability into a multi-purpose unit.  In both cases, the Army 
invested large sums of budget and intellectual capital into these changes that 
were not long lived for the most part.  Interestingly, in the case of nuclear delivery 
systems, the Army retained that capability with its short and medium range 
rockets and missiles, up through the end of the Cold War.  In any event, the 
Army embraced the very new technology that it had initially decried as a poor 
basis for national strategy.  This technology then became the basis for the 
preservation of the Army in the “New Look” based Eisenhower administration.  
The Army’s drifting journey in the early Cold War was defined by interservice 
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rivalry, unclear strategic roles and ill-conceived force structure decisions as a 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  53
IV. THE ARMY’S ATOMIC AGE DOCTRINE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Early Cold War represented a new challenge for both the US and the 
Soviet Union over control of Europe.  Externally, the Soviets found themselves 
facing a now dominant United States, in both military and economic terms. The 
US nuclear monopoly coupled with its untouched industrial base gave the United 
States a distinct advantage in the post war environment.  By contrast, the Soviet 
Union had endured large-scale combat on it territory for four years, damaging its 
already limited industrial infrastructure as well as reducing its working age 
population.  It was in this light that Stalin desired to create strategic “buffer” in 
Eastern Europe and further, to develop atomic weapons in order to balance the 
United States.  The standoff in central Europe between the Soviets and its client 
Warsaw Pact and the United States and its client NATO defined the Cold War for 
its duration.   
The armed forces of both nations had perfected combined arms warfare 
during World War II.  The battles across Europe against the German army had 
educated generations of military leaders from both sides and energized the 
material development process to provide effective weapons systems.  As the 
Cold War developed and nuclear weapons became more available, both armed 
forces began to consider their use in conflict at increasingly lower level of tactical 
conflict.  The U.S. Army invested heavily in nuclear delivery systems and other 
force structure developments in an attempt to better operate on the nuclear 
battlefield.  The U.S. Army gained additional knowledge and experience in Korea 
even though nuclear weapons were not used there.  Nevertheless, the difficulties 
in understanding how and when to utilize nuclear weapons on the next battlefield 
would consume both militaries for the duration of the Cold War. 
As mentioned before, early U.S. warplans focused on strategic air 
bombardment of the Soviet homeland.  The role of ground forces was not clearly 
defined beyond a few general tasks.  Certainly a conventional defense of 
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Western Europe was anticipated, although the ability of NATO and US ground 
forces to substantially delay a Soviet ground offense was questionable.  In 1953, 
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff anticipated that a US and NATO force of 31 
divisions would face between 30 to 80 Soviet divisions in Central Europe.88   
Additionally, Phase I of the 1957 DROPSHOT plan anticipated 10 US divisions in 
support of a total requirement of 60 NATO divisions to hold the Rhine-Alps-Piave 
line.89  Yet the realities of U.S Army force structure during this period portray a 
somewhat different picture.  For instance, the Army maintained 20 divisions on 
active duty during the Korean War.90  These divisions were deployed across the 
world, with 8 in Korea during that conflict, 5 in Europe and 7 retained in the 
United States as a reserve.91  Clearly the U.S. Army forces committed to 
defending Western Europe were intended no to match Soviet forces equally.  
Rather their intent was to occupy Soviet ground forces while the strategic air 
campaign reduced Soviet ability to support the ground campaign.   
Interestingly, Phase II and III of DROPSHOT anticipated a counter attack 
against Soviet forces, and then later occupation of major portions of the Soviet 
Union; this occupation task would require 38 U.S. divisions.92  In 1957 the 
Regular Army comprised 18 divisions, plus 27 National Guard divisions and 11 in 
the Army Reserve.93  These units of course were not all at full strength in 
personnel or equipment, so their ability to conduct the missions intended under 
the DROPSHOT plan could not be accurately analyzed.  The planning, while 
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detailed in force requirement estimation did not take much account of these 
forces operating in areas that had been attacked by nuclear weapons and the 
subsequent need to deal with radiation and massive casualties.  US planning 
expected ground forces to attrit Soviet ground forces attacking in Western 
Europe and at some later point, counter attack and occupy the Soviet homeland.  
Within this framework, the Army struggled to develop doctrine and force structure 
that anticipated conflict in Europe, most likely involving nuclear weapons on the 
tactical battlefield. 
The previous chapter looked at the specific weapons systems and force 
structure the Army created around atomic wepons.  This chapter will look at 
Soviet strategic and operational doctrine during the early Cold War and 
specifically its potential application in Europe.  It will then look at how the US 
Army responded to that threat and how it envisioned fighting that conflict.  
Clearly, nuclear weapons were part of the Army’s concept.  Finally, the chapter 
will look at the Army’s doctrinal developments during the period and how they 
incorporated atomic weapons and the changing force structure.   
B. SOVIET EARLY COLD WAR STRATEGY  
At the end of World War II, the Soviets found themselves in possession of 
a vast new empire, encompassing possessions and client states in the Far East 
to include North Korea, portions of Northern Japan and Eastern Europe.  At the 
same time, four years of bitter conflict on Soviet soil had left the nation physically 
and economically devastated.  Nevertheless, the Soviets retained a large force in 
Eastern Europe ostensibly as a defensive force, but also to consolidate the hard- 
won victory of the Red Army.  The forces in Eastern Europe and at the other 
edges of the Soviet empire were nevertheless reduced, as the Soviet homeland 
required the manpower then occupied in the armed forces.  At the end of the war, 
Soviet armed forces numbered 11.3 million, by 1948 demobilization had returned 
8.5 million to work at restoring the Soviet society, industry and infrastructure.94  
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So, the immediate focus was on holding the gains from the war by retaining 
Eastern Europe and deterring the west, followed by reconstruction of the Soviet 
Union, which would be achieved by retuning manpower to industry. 
With the above priorities in mind, Stalin still understood the potential for 
conflict with the West.  Certainly the United States, with its undamaged industrial 
base, represented an economic and military threat to Soviet Communism.  Post 
war Soviet thought on the next possible conflict with the U.S. was not dissimilar 
to US thoughts about the next conflict.  Specifically, the Soviets considered that: 
A future war was expected to be global, although local conflicts 
were thought to be quite probable.  It was presumed that the war 
would be protracted and would require forces of millions to achieve 
victory.  The war aims would be achieved through the united efforts 
of the armed services, with the ground forces playing the leading 
role and the other services supporting them.95
Of course Stalin’s “permanent operating factors”96 which dealt with the 
weapons, size, strength and morale of Soviet military forces also influenced 
Soviet strategic efforts, even though the factors were originally intended to guide 
the Soviets to victory against the Germans.  The factors and Stalin’s overriding 
personality also focused Soviet learning from the war on its later, more militarily 
successful stage as opposed to its less triumphant early years, which saw 
massive defeat of Red Army forces across the battle front with Germany.  This 
selective learning also supported the Soviet leadership’s efforts to rebuild the 
nation, as well as foment additional social unrest and support for Communist 
ideology in Eastern Europe, while maintaining strength and resolve against the 
United States.  More specifically, Stalin and the Soviet leadership “maintained, 
reorganized and reequipped a large and formidable ground force capable of 
deterring potential United States use of atomic weapons by holding central and 
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western Europe hostage to Soviet ground power.”97  Of course, this force was 
large as it had a twofold task, defend Soviet gains from the war and support the 
Socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. 
Soviet forces in Eastern Europe centered on the GOFG or Group of 
Occupation Forces, Germany.  This force had a mission, much like U.S. forces in 
Germany, the GOFG maintained order, established local governments 
ideologically supportive of Moscow and of course to defend against western 
attack should it occur. In fact a 1946 Soviet military plan for eastern Europe was 
entitled “A Plan for the Active Defense of the Territory of The Soviet Union”, 
which was centered on defeating western aggression and then counterattacking 
to restore the borders established at the end of the war.98  This plan was a 
codification of the war experience against the Germany.  In as much as the 
German army had invaded the Russian homeland, Soviet forces had withdrawn 
trading hundreds of miles of steppe to buy time for Soviet industry to produce 
more weaponry and allow the effects of winter to stall German advances. Then 
with Soviet power rebuilt, a massive offensive to drive the Germans out of the 
country.  This plan was a replay of that experience, substituting US forces for the 
German Army.  With this emerging mission and the lessons from the war, Soviet 
forces also began to upgrade the structure and equipment of their armed forces. 
C. EARLY COLD WAR SOVIET GROUND FORCES 
In the immediate postwar period, the Soviet Military internalized the 
lessons from its late war operations against Germany.  It was during that period 
that Soviet Army commanders at regiment and above perfected Soviet style 
combined arms operations.  In essence, Soviet military operations remained 
unchanged in nature from what had been executed in late 1944 and 1945.  
Postwar Soviet operational art emphasized, “heavy firepower and the rapid 
forward projection of mechanized and heavily armored formations to the depth of 
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the battlefield.”99  To this end Stalin and the military began to adjust the structure 
and outfit the Soviet ground forces.  For instance, Soviet wartime Rifle divisions 
became Motor Rifle divisions, and were reorganized and reequipped such that by 
1953, their firepower was seven times what it had been during the war.100  The 
Soviet Tank divisions adjusted their structure to resemble that of German SS 
Panzer divisions they had faced in the war.101   
This period did not place large emphasis on nuclear weapons in support of 
operations, although Stalin devoted increasing resources to a Soviet nuclear 
weapons program, which, supplemented by a successful espionage campaign 
against the United States, resulted in the first Soviet nuclear detonation in 1949.  
Even so, the integration of nuclear weapons and their impact on ground 
operations did not become accepted until the mid-1950s.  As Andrei A. Kokoshin 
points out 
Soviet predictions about a future war in that period were unvarying.  
They merely projected the previous war into the future….Atomic 
and later thermonuclear weapons scarcely affected Soviet political 
and military thinking in the early postwar years, and continued to be 
overshadowed by ideology and propaganda.102
However, to say Soviet military thinkers did not seriously consider nuclear 
weapons is not accurate.  Soviet thinkers did consider the use of these weapons, 
much in the same way their western counterparts did. 
The Soviet military reforms based on lessons from the war were 
incorporated into reorganized and equipped formations.  The Soviets envisioned 
their ground forces bearing the main burden of accomplishing military and 
political objectives.  This would be achieved through a “strategic offensive”, which 
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was a “main and decisive form of operations” to defeat enemy forces, possess 
territory, and achieve victory.103  Again taking lessons from operations against 
the Germans, the Soviets envisioned a large-scale operation of massed armored 
and mechanized formations.  This represented the mission of the forces in 
Eastern Europe in the early Cold War. 
As referenced above, the GOFG initially intended to defend the Soviet 
possessions in Eastern Europe, counter attacking once the enemy forces had 
been defeated. To accomplish this, the GOFG possessed two combined arms 
armies (the 3d Shock Army and 8th Guards Army), which in 1946 had a total of 
16 divisions (5 rifle divisions, 5 motor divisions and 6 tank divisions).104  Of 
course this represented forces positioned forward and does not account for 
forces in Eastern Europe and the western Soviet Union, which could be quickly 
moved into East Germany.  The 16 divisions in Eastern Europe represented a 
fraction of the estimated 175 total Soviet divisions in 1948.105  The Soviet forces 
in East Germany fluctuated during the late 1940s, although later, after the 1958 
Berlin crisis the totals increased to between 20-24 divisions.106  This force faced 
the U.S. Army in West Germany, and represented the key forward Soviet 
presence of the Cold War.   
C. COUNTERING THE THREAT 
The US Army’s experience during the Korean War had reinforced the 
need for a doctrine able to provide the Army a battlefield advantage against a 
numerically superior enemy.   Subsequently, the Army’s incorporation of nuclear 
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weapons was intended to offset the Army’s smaller size in comparison to the 
Soviet forces it faced in Europe.  The fiscal policy of the Eisenhower 
administration was termed “security with solvency” and was intent on not allowing 
defense spending to grow at the expense of the rest of the U.S. economy.107   
This aspect, taken in concert with the European nations struggling to return their 
societies and economies from the destruction of the war, meant that military 
leaders would be restrained in their ability to spend on new weapons and large 
standing forces.  Nuclear weapons were a key part of this economy that political 
leaders intended, as David Yost points out: 
TNF [Theater Nuclear Forces] would, it was believed, allow the 
United States and its allies to limit spending on conventional forces, 
including operational reserves, while providing a effective posture 
for deterrence and defense in Europe.  During much of the 1950s 
high-level military and political leaders assumed that in the event of 
war TNF would be used as extensively as necessary to help defeat 
Soviet offensives in Europe in conjunction with strategic nuclear 
strikes against the Soviet Union.108
This economic challenge was one of several that faced Army leaders in dealing 
with nuclear weapons. 
An equal challenge was that of developing doctrine that also accounted for 
Soviet use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield.  The possible use of nuclear 
weapons required dispersed forces across the battlefield to ensure that one 
nuclear weapon could not destroy significant portions of a formation.  This 
dispersed force had to then rapidly reform in order to defeat the advancing Soviet 
formations.  
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Total numbers of Soviet units were mentioned above, but it is useful to 
consider Soviet and U.S. ground units in some detail.  Both armies had learned 
from their experience in World War II and the U.S. Army had the added 
experience of Korea.  In Korea the Army had the experience of trying to use 
nuclear weapons in a tactical role, albeit these early attempts were limited by the 
type and size of weapons available at the time.  Although nuclear weapons were 
an expected part of any future battlefield, both the U.S. and Soviet units were still 
optimized for conventional combat.   
The U.S. Army attempted, with its PENTOMIC units to develop a unit and 
associated doctrine capable of both conventional and atomic combat, a dual-
purpose unit.  Of course, the critical difference between the two types of combat 
was in the expected weapons employed, which would create a different 
battlefield environment, and therefore alter the tactics used.  Conventional 
combat would not alter significantly from what each side experienced in the 
Second World War.  However, in the case of atomic combat the expectations 
were an acknowledged unknown despite numerous exercises and weapons tests 
that were intended to improve knowledge and assist in development of tactics.  
Of concern was the expected profligate use of nuclear weapons to augment or 
replicate the effects of traditional artillery fire.  For example, in an exercise called 
‘Carte Blanche’, NATO forces used 355 weapons inside West Germany in the 
span of two days.109  Army leaders saw this possibility as unlikely due to the U.S. 
limited stockpile in the event of war and excessively destructive, given that U.S. 
forces were defending Germany and in the process would destroy the country. 
Western Europe and specifically the border area between West and East 
Germany was where the main battle between U.S. and NATO forces and Soviet 
and Warsaw Pact forces was expected to take place.  West Germany was 
approximately 700 kilometers from North to South and 300 to 400 kilometers 
East to West, which from a tactical and operational military perspective provides 
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limited depth.110  The terrain in Southern Germany is mountainous- abutting the 
Alps; this terrain is unfavorable for attacking armored formations, the area having 
narrow valleys, surrounded by mountains providing defenders the advantage.  
Central Germany is partially open with medium height hills and low mountains 
interspersed. This terrain also favored the defender, easily canalizing an attacker 
into the flat but relatively narrow valleys.  Moving north, the terrain flattens out 
providing greater mobility for armored formations. Of course, the northern plains 
also represented the farthest distance to travel in order to threaten Germany’s 
key industrial and economic centers and subsequently the ports on French and 
Belgian coast. 
The correlation of forces, or the match up of U.S. to Soviet Army forces in 
Europe is illustrative of the challenge the U.S. Army faced.  The U.S. Army 
divisions were part of the overall NATO force arrayed against the Soviets in West 
Germany.  On balance during the Early Cold War, the Soviet Army maintained a 
force of between 16 and 22 divisions in East Germany.  During the early years of 
NATO, the involved nations committed to an overall structure of 30 divisions, with 
NATO relying on nuclear weapons to offset the greater numbers of Soviet 
units.111  In fact, NATO had only 16 to 18 divisions on-hand during this period.112  
Of those 30 NATO divisions, 5 were U.S. Army divisions and the remainder, filled 
by the other NATO members.  Although there had been initial force structure 
goals much higher, European nations were politically unwilling to support larger 
formations, for fear of excessive defense spending while also sustaining 
economic and social recovery from the war.   
Throughout the period of this paper (1947-1957), the US Army maintained 
a 5-division force structure in Europe.  Throughout the Early Cold War period, the 
Army redesignated unit headquarters several times, even though the units and 
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equipment did not significantly change.  This structure contained four infantry 
divisions and one armored division, along with three armored cavalry regiments 
that arguably could equate to a 6th division if employed together.113   Of course, 
cavalry units were intended as reconnaissance forces rather than main combat 
units.  Within the U.S. Army sector in West Germany, those 5 divisions faced 
between 8 and 10 Soviet divisions, depending on how the Soviets attacked.114  
Numerical overmatch was a reality for the U.S. Army throughout the Cold War.  
The best way to offset that disparity occupied the Army for the duration. 
D. ATOMIC DOCTRINE AND UNITS 
Developing tactical and operational doctrine is difficult even in ideal 
circumstances.   For the Army, “doctrine provides a military organization with a 
common philosophy, a language, a purpose, and a unity of effort. “115  The 
constant change of improving technology can rapidly render doctrinal proposals 
useless.  The entire process of military development is an ongoing interaction 
between the national strategy to be executed and supported, the available 
technology that places boundaries on what is feasible and finally the 
development of doctrine and unit force structure to support execution.  The 
Army’s challenge of doctrinal development in the case of atomic weapons, was 
limited understanding of their effects, coupled with other limitations on delivery 
and target acquisition.  In addition, the Eisenhower administrations reliance on 
“Massive Retaliation” as its strategy placed both budgetary and bureaucratic 
pressure on the Army.  The budgetary pressure forced the Army to decide on a 
tradeoff between maintaining force structure and investing in weapons 
technology, a set of decision process that the Army still engages in today.  The 
bureaucratic challenge was in competing for an equal input into military strategy, 
roles and missions.  Given the eminence of the “Massive Retaliation” strategy, 
 
113 John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Division and Separate 
Brigades (Washington D. C., United States Army Center for Military History, 1997) p. 256  
114 David M. Glantz, The Military History of the Soviet Union: A History  (London, Frank Cass, 
1992), p. 184 
115 The United States Army, Field Manual 3-90 Tactics (Washington D.C., Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, July 2001) p. xiii 
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the Air Force became the predominant service, and nuclear weapons became 
the key system.  In this environment, the Army began to develop doctrine for the 
atomic battlefield.   
The Army’s doctrinal development took place at the Command and 
General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.  Ft. Leavenworth also trained 
the Army’s mid-grade officers in Army history, operational and tactical doctrine 
and leadership all in preparation for their jobs as battalion operations officers, 
battalion executive officers or division and corps level planning and operations 
staff. As such, Ft. Leavenworth was the Army’s key intellectual center for 
approaching the complex issue of the atomic battlefield.   
In 1953, two Army officers wrote one of the initial, in-depth studies of 
atomic weapons and their impact on ground forces.  In their book, Atomic 
Weapons in Land Combat, Colonel G.C. Reinhardt and Lieutenant Colonel W.R. 
Kintner analyzed these then new weapons and how the Army might employ them 
in possible scenarios.   In evaluating their use in the offense, Reinhardt and 
Kintner write: 
The concentration of men and guns that once barred frontal assault 
may now comprise the most remunerative target for atomic 
weapons in the enemy’s entire position.  Instead of searching out 
his weakest point for assault, the army equipped with atomic 
missiles may deliberately strike at the foe’s strongest.  Having 
destroyed him there, we scatter his weaker elements by exploiting 
columns of armor and swift infantry followup.116
Of course this concept brought back visions of World War I style mass attacks 
against static defensive positions, albeit with a new element in the form of the 
atomic weapons replacing the days long artillery preparation.  Simultaneously, 
Reinhardt and Kintner also considered Army forces using nuclear weapons as 
part of a defense. 
 
116 Colonel G.C. Reinhardt & Lieutenant Colonel W. R. Kintner, Atomic Weapons in Land 
Combat (Harrisburg, PA, The Military Service Publishing Company, August 1953), p.36 
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In this case of a defense, the problem of targeting the weapons was 
raised, as was the need for Army forces to increase their flexibility.  Reinhardt 
and Kintner again: 
The use of this weapon by defending armies, however, requires 
special conditions for success.  Concentrations, either of enemy 
troops or material, are prerequisites to justify the dispatch of atomic 
missiles…Consequently an opponent must be compelled to 
concentrations on or near the battlefield-by the strength of our 
defense, by some stratagem, by the brilliance of our maneuver or, 
preferably a combination of the three.  An unqualified reliance upon 
building up a static defensive strength through sheer mass leaves 
us wide open to hostile atomic missiles utilized as a superartillery 
preparation. We ourselves will have presented a “concentrated 
target” by attempting to make the enemy do so.117
In both instances, these considerations for employment harkened back to 
previous wars, or required exact conditions for successful employment.  The use 
of atomic weapons in an attack did not offer a new form of maneuver, rather a 
slight variation on the traditional frontal attack.  In the defense scenario, atomic 
weapons were useful only when the enemy force massed, allowing an atomic 
weapon to be used on that target.  Further, in the defense, the conditions that 
would cause an enemy to mass were in fact the very same conditions he would 
look for in selecting an atomic target, i.e. a massed U.S. Army force.  It was this 
realization that increasingly led Army leaders to consider how to achieve an 
advantage in a seemingly stalemated tactical situation.  As the Assistant 
Commandant of the CGSC wrote in 1956: 
In summary, concepts for atomic warfare are, just as in the past, 
aimed at the objective—the destruction of the enemy forces.  There 
may be only a slight difference in offensive and defensive tactics; 
each must rely on dispersion, mobility, and flexibility.  The offense 
will be characterized by rapid exploitation of atomic effects to seize 
deep objectives on wide fronts.  Defense will be resilient instead of 
 
117 Ibid, p.56-7 
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tied to a position.  Integrity may have to be maintained by “rolling 
with the punch,” rather than by holding a line.118
On the atomic battlefield, the attacker may not have any distinct advantage over 
a defender.  Each side would attempt to utilize the same procedures to gain the 
advantage and atomic weapons possessed by both sides would not provide the 
key to success.  
The Army’s solution was the PENTOMIC division, which would have 
improved battlefield mobility, command and control and importantly, its own 
organic atomic delivery systems.  The Army expected the atomic battlefield 
would be “vastly larger in width and depth than those of previous wars”.119  In 
addition, the vulnerability of a massed formation to an atomic strike on the 
expanded battlefield created a need for units to be dispersed and then able to 
rapidly reform.   
In another work written in 1958, two more Army officers attempted to 
refine the previous work and further define the tactics for the PENTOMIC units.  
Colonel Theodore C. Mataxis and Lieutenant Colonel Seymour L. Goldberg 
wrote Nuclear Tactics, Weapons and Firepower in the PENTOMIC Division, 
Battle Group, and Company. This work reviewed nuclear weapons effects and 
protective measures, reviewed PENTOMIC force structure, updated the current 
Army atomic delivery systems capabilities and articulated tactics for the 
PENTOMIC units.    
 These authors benefited from the several years of Army exercises 
involving various unit structures and tactics that Reinhardt and Kintner did not 
have. The authors understood to a greater degree the challenges and stalemates 
that atomic weapons presented at the tactical level.  In regard to the offense, 
Mataxis and Goldberg write: 
 
118 John P. Rose, The Evolution of U.S. Army Nuclear Doctrine, 1945-1980 (Boulder, CO, 
Westview Press, 1980) p. 75 
119 Major Robert M. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976 (Ft. 
Leavenworth, KS, Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 
August 1979) p. 17 
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Attack like defense will change radically on the atomic battlefield.  
Speed, dispersion, flexibility- those keynotes of our whole era will 
take over the battlefield.  Offensive tactics will be based on the 
atomic weapon; masses of atomic firepower will replace massed 
manpower in the attack… The soldier will perform the technical 
tasks and the finishing touches to the attack, but coverage and 
application of force will be strengthened by use of atomic 
weapons…the dispersed, fluid, highly mobile warfare, and the 
tremendous area destructiveness of atomic weapons all place a 
premium on initiative which will favor the aggressive attacker.120
Again, the emphasis on offensive operations is apparent even though there is an 
acknowledgement of the overwhelming impact that atomic weapons would have.  
Add to this the continuing importance of flexible forces and tactical formations. 
By contrast, Mataxis and Goldberg wrote of the defense: 
We must have such coverage of the area that we protect our 
atomic delivery means and logistic support from constant attack 
while at the same time we present a continuous barrier of troops 
and obstacles against which the enemy must mass if he wishes to 
move forward. We must be ready to move in any direction as 
required by the situation. We must be ready to use offensive action 
to destroy the enemy. Above all we must make the atomic weapon 
work for us.121
In this last sentence is the crux of the challenge the Army faced in developing 
doctrine for the atomic battlefield.  In attempting to consider how to “make the 
atomic weapon work” for the Army, the Army developed new force structure as 
well as doctrine that emphasized four tenets: dispersion, mobility, firepower and 
self-containment.122  This in turn meant that units had to conduct multiple 
functions such as the normal tactical missions of offense, defense and self-
protection but also logistics and maintenance and further, be properly equipped 
to do so.  This was the foundation of the PENTOMIC concept, self-contained 
 
120 Colonel Theodore C. Mataxis and Lieutenant Colonel Seymour L. Goldberg, Nuclear 
Tactics, Weapons and Firepower in the PENTOMIC Division, Battle Group, and Company 
(Harrisburg, PA, The Military Publishing Company, October, 1958) p. 211-2 
121 Ibid, .157 
122 John P. Rose, The Evolution of U.S. Army Nuclear Doctrine, 1945-1980 (Boulder, CO, 
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units with nuclear delivery capability, able to operate in a dispersed fashion but 
also able to quickly reform.  Further, these units were intended to fight on a 
conventional battle as well as a nuclear one.    
However, the Army’s studies and exercises of various units and tactics led 
to some disturbing conclusions.  The tactics and techniques needed to fight a 
conventional battle were ill suited for the anticipated atomic battle.   Additionally, 
with the need for self-contained units, the force structure was still increasing 
personnel requirements, rather than the anticipated decrease in size given the 
need for dispersed, smaller units. The Army understood that atomic weapons 
used at tactical level had the potential to destroy or at the very least incapacitate 
entire units up to the battalion level.  The Army’s experience of World War II and 
Korea had indicated a need to be able to replace individuals and perhaps small 
units up to platoon size.  However in an atomic conflict, the Army would have to 
replace much larger formations and would need a support and logistics 
infrastructure in order to do so.  As Lawrence Freedman points out: 
The Army, which had argued all along that the integration of 
nuclear weapons into its inventory would increase rather than 
decrease its troop requirements (on the grounds that limited 
nuclear warfare would turn into a campaign of attrition in which the 
side with the largest reserves was the most likely to prevail) found it 
increasingly difficult to develop nuclear tactics.123
The Army of course was not dismayed to understand that all the issues 
associated with tactical nuclear combat pointed towards a need for increased 
manpower.  The increased need for manpower and equipment still did not have 
an associated doctrine for the employment of these units.  The concepts for use 
focused on dispersion and rapid reformation and of course anticipated the loss of 
units on a nuclear battlefield and the need for replacements.  Further, the Army 
was not in favor of creating two distinct force structures, one for nuclear war and 
one for conventional war.  Although the Army would have welcomed such a 
 
123 Lawrence Freedman as quoted in, Makers of Modern Strategy, From Machiavelli to the 
Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ, Princeton Press, 1986) p. 748 
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possibility, it would have considered it only provided it received appropriate 
funding, and not at the expense of other systems or projects.  This idea was 
considered, but quickly abandoned given the Eisenhower administration’s fiscal 
stance. 
The intent behind the PENTOMIC units was primarily to create an 
organization that could fight on an atomic as well as a conventional battlefield.  A 
secondary concern of the Army was using this PENTOMIC reorganization to 
show efficiency, therefore justifying the Army’s budget to support new weapons 
and equipment as well as force structure.  Nevertheless, between 1956 and 1959 
the Army lost 163,814 soldiers from its previous total of 1, 025,778.124  Further, 
between 1953 and 1960, the Army budget was reduced from $16 billion to $9.3 
billion, despite the reorganization of Army divisional structure and the addition of 
new weapons systems, primarily nuclear delivery type systems.125  This 
background is essential to understanding the shortcomings of the PENTOMIC 
divisions, and perhaps the ultimate motivation behind the PENTOMIC units. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Army’s struggle to develop doctrine that would support its growing 
atomic weapons inventory is indicative of any military force attempting to 
capitalize on new technology.  Even so, the Army developed doctrine that could 
not be executed by the associated force structure it had created to fight on the 
nuclear battlefield.  Further, the Army’s true reason for the new force structure of 
the PENTOMIC units was as much about bureaucratic necessity, given the fiscal 
realities of the Eisenhower administration, as it was about embracing the realities 
of atomic combat.   
Yet given the balance of ground forces in Europe, the Army had to 
acknowledge the potential of atomic weapons to make up for conventional force 
 
124 MAJ Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of U.S.  Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76 
(Leavenworth, KS, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College) 
p.19 
125 John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Division and Separate 
Brigades (Washington D. C., United States Army Center for Military History, 1997) p. 286 
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shortfall.  The U.S. Army faced nearly a 5 to 1 deficit in tanks along with almost a 
3 to 1 shortage in both artillery pieces and personnel.  Atomic weapons were the 
best solution, given the political realities of the period, to reduce that offset.  This 
“best solution” despite the associated consequences of their use, especially in 
profligate amounts as was expected.  
The challenge for the Army was in developing forces and doctrine able to 
fight on a conventional as well as nuclear battlefield and doing so without 
creating two different forces or a single Army that was not fiscally maintainable.  
In the case of the PENTOMIC units, the goal was this so-called “dual capability” 
of a force able to fight conventional or nuclear.  Yet the Army’s doctrine called for 
dispersed forces, able to quickly mass to defeat an attacking enemy formation.  
This was where the PENTOMIC units encountered their most significant 
conceptual and organizational challenge.  The PENTOMIC units were organized 
to facilitate decentralized command and control and enhanced self-sustainability.  
Yet the doctrine of the time required dispersed forces able to quickly form into a 
more traditional mass battle formation.  The PENTOMIC units could not 
accomplish this, having only enough transportation assets to move one of the 
five battle groups at any one time.126  Clearly, the force structure was 
incompatible with the doctrine.  Further; the Army had no budgetary support for 
an increase in its total size, or for, new equipment not associated with nuclear 
weapons delivery. 
Yet in this case, the Army persisted with the incompatibility, with senior 
Army leaders accepting this situation in deference to a greater goal.  That goal 
being retention of an equitable portion of the defense budget, in the face of a 
national security strategy that placed little import on ground forces, and was 
strongly in favor of strategic air bombardment as the primary military mission.   
To be fair, the PENTOMIC structures were well intentioned, as was the doctrinal 
effort.  The PENTOMIC units were the product of intelligent officers attempting to 
 
126 John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Division and Separate 
Brigades (Washington D.C., United States Army Center for Military History, 1997) p. 276 
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produce a tactical and operational solution to a new technological reality on the 
battlefield.  Army leaders were faced with a dilemma that had few positive 
outcomes regardless of decision.  Were Army leaders to commit to the 
PENTOMIC units, dual capability and nuclear weapons as the new standard for 
Army divisions, they risked committing to an untested formation that was also 
under equipped for the missions it was expected to execute.  However, if Army 
leaders abandoned nuclear weapons and their delivery systems as part of the 
new force structure they risked further alienation within the US defense 
establishment and the Eisenhower administration in general.  By abandoning the 
Army’s “nuclear stake”, the Army would surrender its already limited say in policy 
and strategy formulation to the Air Force and Navy.  This would then lead to a 
further reduction in Army budget, something Army leaders could not seriously 
consider. 
The Army faced on overmatch in ground forces in Europe, a fiscally 
restrictive executive branch and a defense and security establishment focused 
on strategic bombing as a unitary solution to the nations principle security threat.  
Additionally, given its recent experience against a numerically superior opponent 
in Korea, the Army found that atomic weapons offered the most promising 
solution to those problems.  Army leaders attempted to reconcile the national 
strategy, emerging technology and doctrinal concepts and force structure, all 
within a fiscally constrained and bureaucratically challenged atmosphere.  Army 
leaders attempted to divine a sustainable solution to this quandary that would not 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The early period of the Cold War represented a challenging time for the 
US Army.  The Army entered the Cold War focused on garrison and constabulary 
duty in Germany and Japan; and rapidly reducing its overall size through rapid 
demobilization.  Further, interservice competition with a newly created Air Force 
over roles and missions increased the Army’s sense of isolation within the 
defense establishment. The Army was also struggling with the emerging reality of 
nuclear weapons.  The Army found itself fighting in Korea, against the very type 
of Communist aggression the nations nuclear weapons were intended to deter.  
Add to this, a political unwillingness to use those very weapons, and the Army 
had to achieve on the ground what nuclear weapons could not achieve coupled 
with massive strategic airpower.    
The interservice rivalries of the early 1950s are well documented.  A newly 
independent air arm had stripped the Army of direct control over two assets it 
valued most: tactical air forces and control and direction of most cargo or heavy 
lift aircraft.   These two shortfalls still preoccupy the Army today.  To further 
exacerbate problems, the Air Force was the benefit of an overall faith in heavy 
strategic bombing as a war-winning tactic.  A natural extension of the strategic 
bombing operations was to marry these aircraft with nuclear weapons.  In so 
doing, an economy of assets was produced, with one aircraft able to do what had 
previously taken 100.  This advantage provided policymakers with a relatively 
easy decision in terms of effort of defense resources; aircraft and bombs were 
cheap in comparison to massive ground formations or naval ships.  Additionally, 
the belief in bombing as a way to rapidly reduce an enemy provided the Air Force 
an easy path to predominance in its infancy. 
By contrast, the Army struggled with its role in the nuclear age.  The Army 
was changing to adjust to new realities of warfare based both in its experience in 
Korea and its expectation of conflict in Europe.  In each case the Army fought or 
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anticipated fighting a numerically superior enemy and sought a technological 
offset to this situation.  The role of the Army in the early Cold War was 
increasingly unclear, as the US security strategy was dominated by the Air Force 
with its focus on strategic bombing.  While the need for ground troops was never 
completely disregarded, the Army was increasingly conceived as a force of 
“exploitation” rather of “decision” in a future conflict.  In this position, the Army 
was forced to embrace nuclear weapons as a way to both retain a central role in 
US security strategy and adjust to the reality of an “atomic battlefield”.  In sum, 
the Army invested a great deal of intellectual capital; force structure and budget 
in atomic weapons, atomic related doctrine and associated force structure. 
B. THE COMPARISONS- THEN AND NOW 
The Army’s challenges of the early Cold War have considerable 
resonance today, as again the Army faces a new challenge in it potential foes 
and areas of combat.  The Army also faces the task of capitalizing on new 
information age technology.  By contrast, the early Cold War Army also faced a 
new enemy in the Soviet Union and new technology in the form of atomic 
weapons.  The chart below outlines a comparison of the early Cold War and the 
current day:  
 CHART 1- COMPARISON OF PERIODS 
E arly C o ld  W ar (1947-1957) C urren t (1995-2004)
• C onstabu la ry D u ty- G erm any &  Japan
• D ecis ion  b y C lose  C om bat
• Ach ieve  M ass by F irepo wer
• PE N T O M IC  D iv is ion  ab le  to  figh t 
nuc lear to  conven tiona l
• N ew  T echno logy- N uc lear W eapons
• In te rserv ice  C onflic t
• C on tinu ing  C on flic t- G loba l Em p ires
• L im ited  C onflic t-K orea
• Enduring  C onflic t- C o ld  W ar 
• Shadow  C onflic t- W W 2
• C onstabu la ry D u ty- Ba lkans
• D ecis ion  b y P rec is ion
• Ach ieve  m ass by p rec is ion  and  w ith  
s tando ff
• M odu la r un its  ab le  to  conduct a  
va rie ty o f m iss ions
• N e w  T echno logy- In fo rm ation  A ge
• In te rserv ice  com petition
• C ontinu ing  C onflic t- Korea  
• L im ited  C onflic t- Iraq  &  A fghan is tan
• Enduring  C on flic t- GW O T
• Shado w  C onflic t- C o ld  W ar
 
This chart identifies key aspects of the Army in both periods of time.  At 
the start of both periods, the US Army was engaged predominantly in 
constabulary or, in its modern term, stability operations.  The tactics of the period 
dictated decision by close combat of forces.  The lesson of the Army’s Korean 
experience showed that in the face of a numerically superior enemy, firepower, in 
the case of Korea artillery, mass was achieved by firepower.  Conversely, in the 
late 1990s, the improvement of precision munitions, allowed commanders to 
strike targets and achieve mass through precision.  Of course, the new 
technology in the early Cold War was the atomic bomb; the new technology of 
today is an amalgam of information technologies, allowing improved 
communications and situational awareness.    
The Early Cold War saw bitter interservice conflict over roles, missions, 
and budget.  Today, the directives of the Goldwater-Nichols Act have forced the 
services to operate “jointly”.  While interservice competition is still evident, the 
relationships between the services, in particular the Army and the Air Force, have 
greatly improved; although the Army still desires greater control over tactical 
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aircraft engaged in close air support, and an increase in transport or lift aircraft to 
better and more rapidly deploy Army forces.  Nevertheless, the ability of joint 
forces to effectively conduct operations has been proven in recent US operations 
from Afghanistan to Iraq. 
The final set of comparisons concerns the overall strategic and 
geopolitical environment the Army operated in during these periods, specifically 
the conflicts involved.  There are three categories: Limited, Enduring and 
Shadow127.  A Limited Conflict is one in which a portion of the Army was involved 
in the execution of combat operations.  As discussed, in the Early Cold War, the 
Korean War was clearly the paradigmatic  “limited” conflict of the period.  The 
current period sees the Army fighting in both Iraq and Afghanistan with a portion 
of the Army’s forces.  In both cases, a limited size Army force, presented 
significant challenges for the Army in supporting these conflicts.   
The category of Enduring Conflict represents a greater requirement for 
strategic focus for the United States, but also the direction and structure of the 
Army.  More directly, an Enduring Conflict represents a long-standing 
commitment of US national will to achieve a goal or desired strategic endstate.  
In the first period, the Cold War itself was the enduring conflict.  The current 
parallel is the United States self-declared Global War On Terrorism.  Clearly the 
Cold War entailed two nation-states with aligned groups of supporting nations, 
whereas the current Global War on Terrorism represents much less clear 
alignments of nations and other actors.  In both cases, the Army had to 
incorporate new technology, fight limited conflicts, while maintaining its primary 
focus on the greater potential conflict it might have to conduct. 
Finally, a Shadow Conflict represents the most recent previous conflict 
that established the basis for the Army’s doctrine, equipment and structure.  The 
Early Cold War had World War II as its Shadow Conflict.  For the present period, 
 
127 I have extrapolated these concepts from Steve Metz and Raymond Millen and their    
Monograph from the US Army War College entitled: FUTURE WAR/ FUTURE BATTLESPACE: 
The Strategic Role of American Landpower 
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the Shadow Conflict is the Cold War.  In both cases, the Army faced multiple 
requirements for a variety of actual and potential conflicts. In the Early Cold War, 
the Army utilized the structure, equipment and the soldiers that had fought and 
defeated the German and Japanese armies just a few years previous.  In the 
current period, the Cold War is fading from the Army’s collective memory with 
both time and newer warfighting experience.   
C. THE IMPACTS 
Nuclear weapons clearly had an impact on the Army of the Early Cold 
War.  The Army was faced with a dual dilemma, in that it did not fundamentally 
accept the need for nuclear weapons as the basis for national strategy much less 
their battlefield utility.  On the other hand, the Army was faced with the possibility 
of losing an increasing share of the defense budget and defense roles and 
missions to the Air Force, which had been able to rapidly capitalize on the current 
strategic thinking about nuclear weapons and their role in the developing and 
possible conflict with the Soviet Union.   
The Army’s embrace of nuclear weapons gave it a tactical and operational 
capability to enhance its effectiveness in the expected conflict in Europe against 
Soviet armored formations.  The Early Cold War saw a significant investment of 
the Army’s budget on nuclear delivery systems, both rocket and cannon.  In the 
Early Cold War, the invested approximately $1.5 billion in nuclear delivery 
systems, this equates to nearly $15.8 billion in 2003 adjusted dollars.128  These 
delivery systems were then incorporated into new force structures of Army 
infantry divisions.   
The new formations known as PENTOMIC divisions were intended to fight 
both conventionally and on an atomic battlefield.  The divisions possessed their 
own organic atomic delivery systems and new tactical doctrine intended to 
benefit from these new weapons and systems.  The emerging doctrine harkened 
back to World War I, as it anticipated the use of atomic weapons to blast a hole 
 
128 Stephen I Schwartz, Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear 
Weapons since 1940 (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institute Press, 1998) p. 149 
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in the enemy formation that would be rapidly exploited by Army units.  
Conversely, Army units were to be employed in a dispersed fashion to reduce 
vulnerability to enemy atomic weapons.  Doctrine written by the Army was never 
able to anticipate with any confidence what level of nuclear weapons use could 
be expected.129 Further, the ability of units configured for conventional ground 
combat were incompatible for expected atomic battlefields, which envisioned 
small, dispersed units able to control land by use of atomic firepower, while 
presenting a small target for enemy atomic weapons.130   
The PENTOMIC Divisions ultimately failed as “dual capable” units, lacking 
the manpower and needed equipment to function as intended on the nuclear 
battlefield.  The concept of “dual-capable” units, while exciting initially, was 
shattered by the reality that such a unit was unable to master either of the tasks 
its was given. The prospect of creating two forces, one for conventional combat 
and the other for atomic war, was not seriously considered, as the budget 
implications to field such forces were enormous. Even though the units intended 
to fight on the nuclear battlefield were eventually scrapped, the possibility of that 
type of conflict did not recede.  The Army retained a nuclear delivery capability 
for the duration of the Cold War as much to retain a reliable share of the defense 
budget as to fulfill some clear battlefield necessity.131  
D. CONCLUSION 
The Early Cold War saw the Army struggle with atomic weapons in terms 
of its role as an executor of national strategy; of developing usable land combat 
doctrine and finally, how it structured its forces.   Although the Army disagreed 
with the national strategy centered on ‘massive retaliation’, it was unable to offer  
 
129 John J. Midgley Jr., Deadly Illusion: Army Policy for the Nuclear Battlefield (Westview 
Press, Boulder, CO 1986) p. 76 
130 Ibid, p.76 
131 Ibid, p. 176-7 
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a viable and agreeable alternative.  From this dilemma, the Army embraced 
atomic weapons with no clear idea of what doing so would mean to the Army.  As 
A. J. Bacevich writes: 
Deluded by the chimera of nuclear weaponry, hotly pursuing the 
false ideal of dual capability, driven by reasons of expediency to 
seek a share of deterrence, the Army never was able to articulate a 
coherent operational concept that would both overcome reigning 
skepticism about land power and provide a comprehensive strategy 
that overcame the deficiencies of massive retaliation.132
The Army found itself accepting these weapons and developing ways to 
incorporate them into the formations and doctrine based on an incomplete and 
unclear picture of what this new technology truly involved.  The Army’s 
investment of both financial and intellectual capital to atomic weapons was a 
dangerous institutional trap. This trap presented the Army with more problems 
than solutions, and ultimately resulted in a shallow but understandable decision 
to embrace the weapons even though the prospect of fighting on a nuclear 
battlefield became an unsolvable tactical and operational quandary.   Given the 
doctrinal insolvency, the Army still embraced these weapons if for no other 
reason than to retain a position within the defense establishment and an 
appropriate share of defense resources.  The Early Cold War represented a 
challenging time for the Army.  Certainly, nuclear weapons represented a 
Utopian solution for many of the perceived national security challenges of that 
time.   Even so, technology alone cannot replace trained and thinking soldiers; 
technology can enhance the effectiveness of soldiers but only if it is part of a 
stable and solid existing foundation.  
 
132 A.J. Bacevich, The PENTOMIC Era: The U.S. Army Between Korea and Vietnam 
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